Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries

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Abstract

Delegating managerial tasks is essential for firm growth. Most firms in developing countries, however, do not hire outside managers but instead rely on family members. In this paper, we ask if this lack of managerial delegation can explain why firms in poor countries are small and whether it has important aggregate consequences. We construct a model of firm growth where entrepreneurs have a fixed time endowment to run their daily operations. As firms grow large, the need to hire outside managers increases. Firms’ willingness to expand therefore depends on the productivity of outside managers. We calibrate the model to plant-level data from the U.S. and India. We identify the key parameters of our theory by targeting the experimental evidence on the effect of managerial practices on firm performance from Bloom et al. (2013). The low productivity of outside managers reduces income per capita in India by 11%. It also contributes to the small size of Indian producers, but would cause substantially more harm for U.S. firms. The reason is that the U.S. firms are larger on average and managerial delegation is especially valuable for large firms. This makes the quality of outside managers and other factors affecting firms’ growth complements.

Keywords: Economic development, growth, selection, competition, firm dynamics, management, entrepreneurship, creative destruction.

JEL Classifications: O31, O38, O40

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1 Introduction

Managerial delegation is essential for firm growth. In the developed world, many family-owned industrial giants, such as Walmart, The Lego Group, or Ford Motor Co., have managed to expand to hundreds of thousands of employees by relying on professional managers to run their key operations. In contrast, firms in developing economies often shun outside managers and recruit managers exclusively among family members. Are such cross-country differences in the ease of managerial delegation important determinants of the process of firm growth? Might such limits to delegation allow small and unproductive firms in poor countries to survive because they limit the competitive pressure from more productive producers? And do they have important macroeconomic implications by reducing aggregate productivity and income per capita? In this paper, we answer these questions both theoretically and quantitatively.

To do so, we propose a macroeconomic model of firm dynamics where managerial inputs are a factor of production and the need for managerial delegation takes center stage. Firms are run by entrepreneurs, who have the opportunity to increase their productivity in order to expand. As the entrepreneur’s own managerial time is a fixed factor, production features decreasing returns and marginal profits decrease in firm size. This reduces firms’ incentives to grow large. Entrepreneurs can endogenously overcome such limits to their span of control by hiring outside managers. If the productivity of outside managers within the firm is low, entrepreneurs have no incentive to invest in productivity growth as they anticipate to not being able to efficiently delegate as they grow. Improvements in the productivity of outside managers therefore induce entrepreneurs to delegate more, raising the returns to growing large and increasing productivity at the aggregate level.

Our theory highlights an inherent complementarity between managerial delegation and firm size. Small firms do not consider the fixed managerial human capital of their entrepreneurs a drag on profitability. It is only once firms expand that the entrepreneur’s span of control becomes binding and outside managers valuable. This non-homotheticity, whereby the demand for outside managers is increasing in firm size, implies that frictions in the process of delegation affect the equilibrium distribution of firm size and the process of reallocation in a specific way. Firms with growth potential are hurt if outside managers cannot be employed efficiently and hence reduce their expansion efforts. In contrast, stagnant firms, which never grow beyond a certain size, benefit from such imperfections: not only do they not hire any managers themselves, but they are more likely to survive as they are shielded from the competition from their dynamic counterparts.

To quantify the importance of this mechanism for the process of reallocation, the equilibrium distribution of firm size and aggregate productivity, we calibrate our model to plant-level micro data from India and the U.S. Our quantitative methodology has two main features. First, we allow the structural parameters of our model to be country-specific and calibrate them to the Indian and U.S. data independently. This approach is important to address the identification problem implied by the non-homotheticity of managerial demand: are firms in India small and managerial delegation rare because outside managers are unproductive? Or do other frictions in India keep firms small and hence reduce the demand for outside managers in equilibrium? Our calibration strategy explicitly recognizes, among other things, that firms in India might face higher barriers to growth (for example, due to capital market inefficiencies or distortionary regulation), that entry
costs might be higher (for example, due to frictions in the access to start-up capital) or that many firms in India might be "subsistence entrepreneurs", who may simply lack the ability to grow their firms beyond a certain size (Schoar, 2010; Decker et al., 2014). By allowing these features of the environment to be arbitrarily correlated with the productivity of outside managers, we refrain from attributing all differences between the U.S. and India to our mechanism of interest.

Secondly, we use well-identified micro-estimates as "identified moments" to calibrate our structural model (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018). Specifically, we exploit variation in managerial practices based on a randomized experiment to estimate the production function for managerial inputs. In a well-known field experiment, Bloom et al. (2013) provided a randomly selected group of Indian textile companies with management consulting to introduce American-style frontier management practices. They show that this intervention induced the treated firms to expand: after two years, the firms that benefited from the intervention were 9% larger than firms in the control group. We explicitly use this estimated treatment effect as a moment for our structural model. In particular, we replicate the experiment in our model to estimate the elasticity of firm profits with respect to managerial inputs via indirect inference. This ensures that our model generates the right microeconomic response to the experimental "management" intervention.

We then use our calibrated model to analyze the process of firm dynamics in the U.S. and India and to quantify the role of differences in the productivity of outside managers. This analysis yields three main conclusions.

First, we show that the Indian economy suffers from a significant lack of selection, where subsistence producers survive for a long time because firms with growth potential have low incentives to expand. Hence, the glut of small firms in India may not merely be a reflection of frictions that those small firms face but rather an indication of a lack of competition stemming from larger firms. Policies aimed at supporting small firms, e.g., micro-finance programs, while potentially desirable for their redistributive properties, could be harmful by reducing the reallocation of resources from small stagnant firms to firms with growth potential. This is consistent with the dual economic view of development by La Porta and Shleifer (2008, 2014), who argue that the decline in informality associated with economic growth is mostly driven by formal firms replacing informal producers.

Second, we show that the productivity of outside managers in India, which we estimate to be substantially lower than in the U.S., is partly responsible for this lack of selection and has important implications for aggregate economic performance. If Indian firms could use outside managers as efficiently as firms in the U.S, their incentives to expand would be higher. This would increase aggregate productivity and income per capita in India. Our estimates imply that differences in the productivity of outside managers reduce income per capita in India by about 11%.

Finally, the complementarity of firm size and delegation implies an important interaction between the productivity of outside managers and other differences between India and the U.S. While the process of firm dynamics in India does depend on the delegation environment, the implications are modest. We find that an increase in the quality of delegation to U.S. standards would increase average firm size by around 3% and reduce the employment share of small firms by a similar amount. If, in contrast, U.S. firms could use outside managers only as unproductively as

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1We are very grateful to Nick Bloom and his coauthors that they were willing to share their data with us.
firms in India, the consequences would be much more severe: average firm size would decline by almost 15%, and the employment share of small firms would increase by 20%. The reason for such differences is that the productivity of outside managers and other non-managerial factors that determine firm expansion naturally interact. Our estimates imply that firms in the U.S. are much more efficient in increasing their productivity and that stagnant subsistence entrepreneurs are relatively scarce. Preventing these dynamic entrepreneurs from growing affects the process of firm dynamics substantially. This is very different in India, where subsistence firms are abundant, and firms face a high cost of expansion. Hence, other frictions, such as credit market imperfections or distortions to market entry, not only hamper firm growth directly but also reduce the effect of improvements in the delegation environment on firms’ expansion incentives.

**Related Literature** That managerial delegation might be a key determinant of firm dynamics and the extent of macroeconomic reallocation goes back to the early work of Edith Penrose, who argues that managerial resources are essential for firms to expand and that a scarcity of managerial inputs prevents the weeding out of small firms as "bigger firms have not got around to mopping them up" (Penrose, 1959, p. 221). Recently, more systematic evidence for the importance of managerial inputs has accumulated. In particular, managerial practices differ systematically across countries, and firms in developed economies are larger and delegate more managerial tasks to outside managers (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010).

We formalize and quantify the macroeconomic importance of such managerial considerations by providing a new theory of firm dynamics and the resulting firm size distribution in developing countries. Our theory incorporates limits to firms’ span of control as in Lucas (1978) into a micro-founded model of Schumpeterian growth following Klette and Kortum (2004), which has been shown to provide a tractable and empirically successful theory of firm dynamics (see for instance Acemoglu et al., 2018; Akcigit and Kerr, 2018; Garcia-Macía et al., 2019; Lentz and Mortensen, 2008). By explicitly allowing firms to hire outside managers, our model makes firms’ span of control a choice variable which is jointly determined with the process of firm dynamics and the equilibrium distribution of firm size.

Frictions in the market for managerial inputs are also highlighted in Caselli and Gennaioli (2013), Powell (2019), Grobvosek (2015) and Bloom et al. (2016). In contrast to our theory, all of these papers assume that firm productivity is exogenous, i.e. there is no interaction between the delegation environment and firm growth. Guner et al. (2018), Roys and Seshadri (2014) and Xi (2016) present dynamic models of (managerial) human capital accumulation but do not focus on the implications for the resulting process of selection and firm dynamics. Finally, there is a large literature on the internal organization of the firm - see, for example, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2015) for a survey. This literature has a much richer micro structure of firms’ delegation environment but does...
not focus on the resulting properties of firm dynamics. Our model explicitly allows for heterogeneity in firms’ innate growth potential. This heterogeneity is important to formalize the idea that limits to delegation affect the degree selection, i.e. the extent to which firms with growth potential replace stagnant, subsistence producers. There is ample empirical evidence for the importance of such heterogeneity. Schoar (2010) and Decker et al. (2014) argue that some entrepreneurs are "transformative" and have the necessary skills to expand, while subsistence entrepreneurs may simply never grow independently of the environment they operate in. Hurst and Pugsley (2012) provide evidence that many firms in the U.S. intentionally choose to remain small. In the context of developing countries, Banerjee et al. (2015) and De Mel et al. (2008) stress the importance of persistent differences in growth potential. On the theoretical side, Luttmer (2011) and Lentz and Mortensen (2016) argue that models without heterogeneity in growth potential are unable to explain the very rapid growth of a subset of the U.S. firms.

Finally, on the methodological front, our paper adds to recent literature in macroeconomics that uses well-identified microeconomic estimates to identify structural models (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018). Recent examples in the literature on growth and development are Lagakos et al. (2018), Kaboski and Townsend (2011) and Brooks and Donovan (2017). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to use this methodology to estimate a model of firm dynamics.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the theoretical model. Section 3 summarizes the data that we use in our quantitative analysis and discusses the identification of the model. Section 4 contains the calibration results and discusses a variety of non-targeted moments. In Section 5 and 6, we provide our main analysis to quantify the role of the delegation environment for firm dynamics and the aggregate economy. Section 7 provides various robustness checks of the main quantitative results. Section 8 concludes. All proofs and additional details are contained in the Appendix. An Online Appendix contains further results.

2 Theory

2.1 Technology, Preferences and Static Allocations

We consider a continuous time economy, where a representative household values the consumption of a unique final good, maximizes the sum of per-period utilities \( U(C_t) = \ln(C_t) \) and discounts the future at rate \( \rho \). Labor is supplied inelastically, and the members of the household can work as either managers or production workers. The final good \( Y \) is a Cobb-Douglas composite of a unit continuum of varieties,

\[
\ln Y = \int_0^1 \ln y_j dj, \quad (1)
\]

4There is also a large empirical literature on family firms - see e.g. Bertrand and Schoar (2006). La Porta et al. (1999) document that family members are regularly controlling shareholders in most countries. Bennedsen et al. (2007) use variation in the gender of the CEO’s firstborn child to present causal evidence that family successions have a negative impact on performance. In contrast, Mueller and Philippon (2011) argue that family ownership has distinct benefits in environments of hostile labor relations.
and is used for consumption \((C_t)\) and for productivity enhancing investments by incumbents \((R_t)\) and entrants \((R_{E,t})\). The aggregate resource constraint is therefore given by

\[ Y_t = C_t + R_t + R_{E,t}. \]  

(2)

To save on notation we will drop the time subscript \(t\) whenever it does not cause any confusion.

Producing the variety \(y_j\) requires both production workers and managerial inputs. In particular, we assume that managers increase the efficiency of production workers so that firm \(f\) can produce good \(j\) according to

\[ y_{jf} = q_{jf} \phi(e_{jf}) l_{jf}, \]  

(3)

where \(q_{jf}\) is the firm-product specific efficiency, \(l_{jf}\) is the number of production workers employed in producing intermediate good \(j\), \(e_{jf}\) denotes the amount of managerial services firm \(f\) allocates toward the production of good \(j\), and \(\phi(e_{jf}) \geq 1\) is an increasing function translating managerial services into physical productivity units. Letting \(w_p\) denote the equilibrium wage for production workers, the production labor cost of producing one unit of \(y\) is therefore given by \(MC = \frac{w_p}{\phi(e)}\). Note that firms can produce multiple products \(j \in [0, 1]\). In equilibrium, product \(j\) will be produced by the firm with the highest productivity \(q_{j}\). Firm \(f\) will therefore produce \(n_f\) products if it has the highest quality in \(n_f\) product markets. We denote the producer’s (i.e. the highest) productivity of variety \(j\) by \(q_j\).

In order to focus on the interaction between managerial delegation and the resulting equilibrium process of firm dynamics, we keep the static market structure as tractable as possible. To do so, we assume that in each market \(j\) the producing firm competes against a competitive fringe of potential producers that can produce variety \(j\) at marginal costs \(w_p/q_j\).\(^5\) Because the demand function stemming from (1) has a unitary elasticity, the producing firm engages in limit pricing, i.e. it sets its price equal to the marginal costs of the competitive fringe. The gross profits after paying for production workers \(l_j\) (but before paying any managers the firm might decide to hire) are therefore given by\(^6\)

\[ \pi_j(e_j) = p_jy_j - w_pl_j = \left( \frac{\phi(e_j) - 1}{\phi(e_j)} \right) Y. \]  

(4)

Hence, profits on variety \(j\) depend directly on the amount of managerial services that are allocated toward the production of the \(j\)th variety, \(e_j\). Because managerial inputs increase physical productivity, more managerial inputs allow firms to increase their profitability. For analytical convenience, we assume that \(\phi(e) = \frac{1}{1 - e^\sigma}\), where \(e \in [0, 1]\) and \(\sigma < 1\). This implies that

\[ \pi(e_j) = e_j^{\sigma} Y, \]  

(5)

i.e., profits are a simple power function of managerial effort parameterized by the elasticity \(\sigma\).

\(^5\)This assumption allows us to abstract from strategic pricing decisions of firms who compete with firms of different productivity. A model with strategic pricing behavior is analyzed in Peters (2018). In terms of primitives, the fringe firms have access to the same technology as the leading firm and to a level of managerial services \(\phi\), which we normalize to unity.

\(^6\)To see this, note that \(p_jy_j - w_pl_j = \left(1 - \frac{w_pl_j}{p_jy_j}\right) p_jy_j = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\phi(e_j)}\right) Y = \left(\frac{\phi(e_j) - 1}{\phi(e_j)}\right) Y\) as \(p_j = w_p/q_j\) and \(p_jy_j = Y\).
Managerial resources not only affect firm profitability but also the aggregate allocations. In particular (see Section OA-1.1 in the Online Appendix), aggregate output $Y$ is given by:

$$Y = QML^P,$$

where $L^P = \int_0^1 l_jdj$ denotes the mass of production workers, $\ln Q = \int_0^1 \ln q_jdj$ is an index of aggregate physical productivity and $M = \left(1 - \int_0^1 e^\sigma jdj\right)^{-1}$ summarizes the static effect of the available managerial resources on aggregate productivity. In particular, $M$ is increasing in $e_j$, reflecting the positive effect of managerial inputs on labor productivity at the firm-level.

### 2.2 Delegation, Span of Control and Firms’ Incentives to Grow Large

At the heart of our theory is the link between managerial delegation and firms’ dynamic incentives to grow large. As in Klette and Kortum (2004) firms produce multiple products and grow by expanding into new product markets. In particular, by replacing the current producer of variety $j$, the firm adds new products to its portfolio and grows in sales, employment and profits.

Because profits of each variety depend directly on the amount of managerial resources $e$, the availability of such resources is a key determinant of firms’ incentives to expand. More specifically, we assume that firms are run by entrepreneurs, who have a fixed endowment $T < 1$ of managerial efficiency units they provide inelastically to their firms.\footnote{Recall that $e < 1$ for $\mu(e) = (1 - e^\sigma)^{-1}$ to be well-defined. It can be shown that $T < 1$ is sufficient to ensure that this condition is satisfied.} If an entrepreneur is the current producer in $n$ markets, she will have $e_j = T/n$ units of managerial services per variety. That she will want to spread her $T$ units of managerial time equally across all product lines follows directly from the concavity of $\pi$. The total profits of a firm producing $n$ varieties are hence

$$\Pi(n) = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \pi(e_j) = n \times \pi \left( \frac{T}{n} \right) = T^\sigma n^{1-\sigma} Y.$$

This expression has a simple but important implication: While the profits of the firm are increasing in the number of varieties $n$, they do so at a decreasing rate. The reason is that the owner has a fixed endowment $T$ which limits her span of control as in Lucas (1978): as the existing supply of managerial resources is spread over more and more production units, the marginal profitability declines. This implies that firm size $n$ and the entrepreneur’s managerial endowment $T$ are complements in that the marginal return to a unit of additional managerial resources is increasing in firm size

$$\frac{\partial^2 \Pi(n)}{\partial n \partial T} > 0.$$

Hence, entrepreneurs with larger firms consider their fixed time endowment more of a bottleneck.

**Delegation** To counteract these decreasing returns, the entrepreneur can hire outside managers to augment her own endowment of managerial resources. It is this distinction between entrepreneurs and outside managers which makes firms’ span of control endogenous in our theory: while en-
entrepreneurial human capital $T$ is in fixed supply at the firm level, outside managers can be hired on the market. We assume that the entrepreneur’s and the manager’s human capital are perfect substitutes and that the relative productivity of outside managers within the firm is given by $\alpha$. Hence, if an owner of a firm with $n$ varieties hires $m$ units of managerial human capital for the production of variety $j$, the total amount of managerial services $e$ is given by

$$e(m) = \frac{T}{n} + \alpha \times m.$$  

(7)

Hence, the parameter $\alpha$ governs the efficiency of outside managers within the firm, and we therefore refer to it as the firm-specific productivity of outside managers: the higher $\alpha$, the more managerial services a given manager generates within the firm. It is a parameter of the firms’ production function, and it is the key parameter for our analysis. In particular, we ask whether $\alpha$ is an important determinant of the process of firm dynamics and aggregate economic performance. While $\alpha$ could in principle vary at the firm level, we assume that $\alpha$ is constant across firms within a country and varies only at the country level. For brevity we will also refer to $\alpha$ as the "productivity of outside managers".

One can think of many reasons why $\alpha$ might be lower in a developing economy like India. First of all, there is a large empirical literature which argues that the prevalence of efficient management practices, such as quality standards, monitoring, or meritocratic promotions, varies systematically with the level of development (see e.g. Bloom et al. (2012) or Bloom and Van Reenen (2010)). Secondly, the productivity of outside managers could depend on the level of technology. For example, if managerial efficiency is complementary to IT equipment, technological differences across countries will be a source of variation in $\alpha$. Finally, $\alpha$ can be interpreted as a reduced form specification of the prevailing institutional or cultural environment. If, for example, contractual imperfections are severe or the level of trust is low, entrepreneurs might need to spend substantial amounts of their own time monitoring their managerial personnel. This reduces the net time gain each outside manager adds to the firm.\(^8\)

We assume that outside managers are hired on a spot market at a given wage $w_M$. This implies that the firm’s delegation problem is static and the owner simply maximizes the total profits of the firm by choosing the optimal amount of managerial inputs. Using (5) and (7), total profits (net of managerial payments) of a firm with $n$ products are therefore given by:

$$\Pi(n) \equiv \sum_{j=1}^{n} \max_{m_j \geq 0} \left\{ \left( \frac{T}{n} + \alpha m_j \right)^\sigma \right\} Y - w_M m_j \right\}.$$

(8)

The maximization problem in (8) defines both firms’ demand for managerial inputs and their final profit function. Two properties are noteworthy. First of all, the entrepreneur’s inelastically supplied managerial input $T$ generates a well-defined extensive margin for managerial hiring. In particular, the firm only hires outside managers if the size of the firm exceeds the endogenous delegation cutoff

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\(^8\)In Section (OA-1.2) in the Online Appendix, we provide a simple micro-founded example, where a contractual game between the owner and outside managers leads to equation (7) and $\alpha$ is a combination of explicit structural parameters.
\( n^*(\alpha) \), which is given by
\[
n^*(\alpha) = T \times \left( \frac{\omega_M}{\sigma \alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}},
\]
where \( \omega_M = w_M/Y \). Hence, small firms rely purely on the time of the owner and only start delegating once they reach a size \( n > n^*(\alpha) \). Note that the cutoff \( n^*(\alpha) \) is decreasing in \( \alpha \). Hence, if outside managers’ human capital can be employed very efficiently within firms, even small firms utilize outside managers. Second, it is easy to verify that the optimal managerial demand per variety \( m(n) \), conditional on hiring, i.e. if \( n > n^*(\alpha) \), is given by
\[
m(n) = \left( \frac{\sigma}{\omega_M} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \alpha^{\frac{\sigma}{1-\sigma}} - \frac{T}{\alpha n}.
\]
Note first that \( m(n) \) is increasing in \( n \), i.e. larger firms hire more managers per variety to make up for the fact that their own managerial resources are spread thinner and thinner as the firm gets larger. Hence, even conditional on hiring, the demand for outside managerial resource is non-homothetic as larger firms hire managers more intensely.\(^9\) Moreover, the demand for outside managers is increasing in the productivity of outside managers, holding \( \omega_M \) constant.

Substituting firms’ optimal delegation policies into (8) implies that firm profits are given by
\[
\Pi(n;\alpha) = \hat{\pi}(n;\alpha) \times Y \text{ where } \hat{\pi}(n;\alpha) = \begin{cases} 
T^\sigma n^{1-\sigma} 
& \text{if } n < n^*(\alpha) \\
T^\sigma \left( \frac{\omega_M}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\omega_M} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} n 
& \text{if } n \geq n^*(\alpha).
\end{cases}
\]
This profit function is a crucial object in our analysis, because it reflects the firm’s span of control, i.e. the marginal return to increasing the number of markets in which it is active. Importantly, the possibility of delegation endogenizes the firm’s span of control and makes it directly dependent on \( \alpha \).

To see this, consider the left panel in Figure 1, where we depict the profit function \( \hat{\pi}(n;\alpha) \) for two different levels of \( \alpha^L < \alpha^H \), holding the managerial wage \( \omega_M \) fixed. Small firms are run only by their owner and are subject to diminishing returns: as long as they do not delegate, the marginal profit from producing an additional product is declining, i.e. \( \hat{\pi}(n;\alpha) \) is concave in \( n \). Once firms reach the delegation cutoff \( n^* \) and start hiring outside managers, however, the profit function becomes linear in the number of markets \( n \). Hence, entrepreneurs overcome their limited span of control by delegating managerial tasks to outside managers. Now consider an increase in the productivity of outside managers. This reduces the delegation cutoff, and smaller firms start to rely on outside managers. Importantly, an increase in \( \alpha \) also increases the slope of the profit function. It is this channel that links the delegation environment and the process of firm dynamics: a higher \( \alpha \) increases firms’ span of control and raises the returns to growing large.

Our model nests two workhorse models in the literature as special cases. When \( \alpha = 0 \) there is no scope for outside delegation. In that case, \( n^* = \infty \), and all firms are subject to diminishing returns as in Lucas (1978). On the other hand, when \( \alpha \) is sufficiently large so that \( n^* < 1 \), every firms delegates, the limited span of control of the owner’s own time time \( T \) is not a bottleneck, and firms’

\(^9\)In Section 3.1 we provide direct evidence that such non-homotheticities are empirically important in the Indian micro data.
profit functions are linear as in the baseline version of Klette and Kortum (2004). Hence, our model offers a simple framework where the firm’s span of control is endogenous: it is a choice variable which depends on both the productivity of outside managers $\alpha$ and the endogenous factor prices $\omega^M$ and is hence determined in equilibrium.

**Figure 1: Delegation, Decreasing Returns and Expansion Incentives**

**Panel A: Delegation and Decreasing Returns**

- $\tilde{\pi}(n; \alpha)$
- $\tilde{\pi}(n; \alpha^H)$
- $\tilde{\pi}(n; \alpha^L)$

**Panel B: Optimal Expansion Rate**

- $x(n; \alpha^H)$
- $x(n; \alpha^L)$

Notes: In Panel A we depict the profit function $\tilde{\pi}(n; \alpha)$ characterized in (11) for $\alpha^L$ and $\alpha^H$, $\alpha^L < \alpha^H$ given the managerial wage $\omega^M$. In Panel B we depict the optimal expansion schedule $x(n; \alpha)$ in (14).

**Firm Expansion** The productivity of outside managers is a crucial determinant of firms’ incentives to expand into new product markets. For now we consider the behavior of an individual firm. In Section 2.3 we embed this structure into a general equilibrium model. We model firm growth as a stochastic process where the firm can chose the rate at which it improves the productivity $q$ of a randomly selected product by $\gamma_t > 1$ and thereby replaces the existing firm as the producer of the product. In particular, if a firm with $n$ varieties invests $R$ units of the final good, it expands into a new product line at rate

$$X(R; \theta, n) = \theta \frac{R}{Q} n^{1-\zeta},$$

(12)

where $\theta$, which we refer to as firms’ growth potential, determines the efficiency of innovation, $\zeta < 1$ parametrizes the convexity of the expansion cost function and $Q_t$ is the productivity index defined in (6). At the same time, each product the firm currently produces gets improved upon by other firms at rate $\tau_t$. This rate of creative destruction is of course endogenous and determined in equilibrium, but firms take it as given.

To characterize the firm’s optimal expansion policy, we need to solve for its value function. The value of a firm with $n$ products, $V_t(n)$, solves the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation

$$r_t V_t(n) - \dot{V}_t(n) = \Pi_t(n; \alpha) - n \tau_t [V_t(n) - V_t(n-1)] + \max_{X} \left\{ X \left[ V_t(n+1) - V_t(n) \right] - Q_t n^\zeta \left( \frac{X}{\theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\zeta}} \right\},$$

(13)

Because we denote innovation costs in terms of the final good, the scaling variable $Q$ is required to keep the model stationary. We also assume that firms’ innovation costs depend on the number of varieties $n$ to generate deviations from Gibrat’s law solely through incomplete delegation. In particular, if the profit function in (11) were linear, the specification in (12) would imply that firm growth is independent of size.
where \( \dot{V}_t \equiv \partial V_t / \partial t \). The right-hand side of (13) consists of three parts. First, the firm earns the flow profits \( \Pi_t (n; \alpha) \) given in (11). Secondly, the firm might lose one of its products to other firms. This occurs at the endogenous rate of creative destruction \( n \tau_t \) (because each product gets replaced at rate \( \tau_t \)). Finally, the value function incorporates the option value of expansion: at flow rate \( X \) the firm expands into a new market and experiences a capital gain of \( V_t (n + 1) - V_t (n) \). The associated costs of expanding into a new market stem from (12). Note that the function \( V_t \) directly depends on the productivity of outside managers \( \alpha \) via the profit function.

This value function implicitly defines firms’ optimal rate of expansion and productivity growth. Letting \( x \equiv X/n \) denote the expansion intensity, optimality requires that

\[
x_t (n; \alpha) = \theta^{\frac{1}{1-\xi}} \frac{\dot{V}_t (n + 1) - V_t (n)}{Q_t}^{\frac{\xi}{1-\xi}}.
\]

(14)

Naturally, the incentives to expand depend on the marginal return to doing so, \( V_t (n + 1) - V_t (n) \). It is this marginal return that links firms’ innovation incentives to the productivity of outside managers. In equation (11) and the left panel of Figure 1 we showed that \( \alpha \) determines the concavity of the profit function and hence the marginal flow profit of expansion. Because the value function inherits the properties of the profit function, \( \alpha \) also determines the slope of the value function and hence the optimal innovation rate for firms of different sizes.

In the right panel of Figure 1 we depict the optimal innovation rate \( x (n; \alpha) \) for two values of \( \alpha \). The concavity of the profit and value function implies that firms’ expansion incentives are declining in size. An increase in \( \alpha \) affects this schedule in two ways. First, an increase in the productivity of managers from \( \alpha_L \) to \( \alpha_H \) shifts the whole expansion schedule upwards. Intuitively, if firms anticipate to being able to hire outside managers more efficiently once they reach the delegation cutoff \( n^* \), their incentives to expand will already be higher today. Similarly, firms that are already delegating also increase their expansion efforts as their profitability increases. Secondly, innovation incentives increase more for larger firms, so that the schedule \( x (n; \alpha) \) becomes flatter. Hence, improvements in the delegation environment are particularly important for large firms, who rely heavily on outside managers.

### 2.3 Firm Dynamics and Delegation in General Equilibrium

We now embed this model of firm growth into a general equilibrium model of firm-dynamics. At each point in time there is a set of existing firms whose innovation rates are given by (14), and a set of potential entrants that enter the economy by improving upon existing producers.

**Firm Heterogeneity** We explicitly allow firms to be heterogeneous in their growth potential. It is this heterogeneity across producers that gives rise to the possibility of selection. Formally, we assume that firms differ in their innovation efficiency \( \theta \) and can be either transformative (high, \( \theta_H \)) or subsistence (low, \( \theta_L \)) types. A firm’s type is persistent and determined upon entry. Each new entrant
draws a firm type $\theta \in \{\theta_H, \theta_L\}$ from a Bernoulli distribution, where

$$\theta = \begin{cases} \theta_H & \text{with probability } \delta \\ \theta_L & \text{with probability } 1 - \delta \end{cases}. \quad (15)$$

To capture the existence of subsistence entrepreneurs, we assume that $\theta_L = 0$, so that low-type firms are entirely stagnant. This polar case is conceptually useful because the sole difference in firm dynamics across countries then stems from the innovation incentives for high types – it is the high types’ appetite for expansion that determines the degree of selection, i.e., the time it takes for low-type firms to be replaced.

In addition, we also allow for firms to potentially differ in the rate at which they lose markets due to differences in their reputation, customer loyalty, or organizational capital. Letting $\tau_H$ and $\tau_L$ be the rates at which high and low-type firms lose a given product to other firms (both of which will be determined in equilibrium), we assume that $\tau_L = \beta \tau_H$. If $\beta > 1$, low-type firms are easier to replace (or are targeted by expanding firms more intensely), if $\beta < 1$, the opposite is the case. The parameter $\beta$ is one of our structural parameters which we will calibrate from the data. Allowing for $\beta \neq 1$ is not conceptually important; we introduce it mostly for quantitative reasons.

To summarize, the behavior of high types is described by the optimal expansion rate in (14) and the value function in (13) (which from now on we denote by $V_t^H(n)$). Subsistence entrepreneurs, in contrast, never innovate and hence never grow beyond a single product; they exit at rate $\tau_{L,t}$. Their value function is therefore simply given by

$$r_t V_t^L - \dot{V}_t^L = \Pi_t (1; \alpha) - \tau_{L,t} V_t^L. \quad (16)$$

**Entry** A unit mass of potential entrants attempts to enter the economy at any point in time. They use a similar innovation technology as incumbent firms, where the flow rate of entry $z$ is related to the spending on entry efforts $R_E$ according to $z = \theta_E [R_E/Q]^{\xi}$. Entrants enter the economy with a single, randomly selected product, and the realization of their growth potential $\theta$ is revealed only after entering the market. Given that an entrant becomes a high-type with probability $\delta$, the equilibrium entry flow is given by:

$$z_t(\alpha) = \operatorname{argmax}_z \left\{ z \left[ \delta V_t^H (1) + (1 - \delta) V_t^L \right] - Q_t \theta_E^{\frac{1}{\xi}} z^{\frac{1}{\xi}} \right\} = \theta_E^{\frac{1}{\xi}} \left[ \frac{\delta V_t^H (1) + (1 - \delta) V_t^L}{Q_t} \right]^{\frac{1}{\xi}}. \quad (17)$$

Note that the equilibrium entry flow depends on the delegation environment $\alpha$ through firms’ value function.

Figure 2 provides an overview of the life cycle dynamics in our model. Firms enter the economy with a single product and are either transformative, high-type entrepreneurs (with probability $\delta$) or subsistence, low-type entrepreneurs (with probability $1 - \delta$). The corresponding value functions are $V_t^H (1)$ and $V_t^L$. Within the next time interval $\Delta t$, high-type firms either expand (at rate $x_1$), lose their only product and exit (at rate $\tau_H$), or remain a one-product firm (at rate $1 - x_1 - \tau_H$). In contrast, low-type firms never expand but instead either exit (at rate $\tau_L$) or remain in the economy by serving their initial market.
The Productivity of Outside Managers and the Firm Size Distribution  The equilibrium firm size distribution is endogenously determined from firms’ expansion and entry incentives and hence depends on the delegation environment $\alpha$. In particular, let $F_H^H$ be the mass of high-type producers with $n$ products and $F_L^L$ be the mass of low-type producers (all of which have a single product). In a stationary equilibrium, these are constant over time and have a simple expression\(^{11}\)

\[
F_H^H(\alpha) = \frac{\delta z(\alpha)}{nx(n; \alpha)} \prod_{j=1}^{n} \left( \frac{x(j; \alpha)}{\tau_H(\alpha)} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad F_L^L(\alpha) = \frac{(1 - \delta)z(\alpha)}{\tau_L(\alpha)}. \tag{18}
\]

Furthermore, the aggregate rate of creative destruction is given by

\[
\tau(\alpha) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} nx(n; \alpha) F_H^H(\alpha) + z(\alpha), \tag{19}
\]

because existing producers get replaced both by other incumbent firms and new entrants. Note that (18) and (19) fully determine the equilibrium firm size distribution as a function of $x_t(n; \alpha)$ and $z_t(\alpha)$ because $\tau_L = \beta \tau_H$ and consistency requires that $\tau = \tau_H(1 - F_L^H) + \tau_L F_L^L$, as $F_L^L$ is the share of products which are produced by subsistence entrepreneurs.

The expressions in (18) are informative about how managerial delegation shapes the distribution of firm size. Recall that firm sales are proportional to the number of products $n$. The aggregate share of sales of firms with $n + 1$ products relative to firms with $n$ products is given by

\[
\frac{(n + 1)F_H^{n+1}}{nF_H^n} = \frac{x(n; \alpha)}{\tau_H(\alpha)}.
\]

Hence, the relative importance of large producers is directly determined by the size-dependent innovation schedule $x(n; \alpha)$. If managerial productivity is low, firms’ span of control is a bottleneck for large firms, the optimal innovation rate declines steeply in size and so does the aggregate importance of large firms. Improvements in the efficiency of managers within firms therefore induce

\(^{11}\)See Section A.1 in the Appendix for the proof
reallocation towards large producers.

Similarly, the expression for the equilibrium mass of subsistence firms $F_L$ shows why inefficient delegation reduces selection and keeps low-type firms alive. Because subsistence firms exit the economy at rate $\tau_L$ and enter the economy at rate $z(1-\delta)$, the long-run mass of subsistence producers is given by $(1-\delta)z/\tau_L$ as in (18). Because inefficiencies in delegation harm large firms more than small firms, changes in $\alpha$ affect creative destruction more than the entry rate. Thus, $z/\tau_L$ and hence $F_L$ are both declining in $\alpha$. Environments where outside managers are not very productive make it easy for low-type firms to survive.

**Creative Destruction and Aggregate Growth**

The rate of creative destruction in (19) is also the main driver of aggregate growth in our economy. Recall that each successful innovation increases productivity by the step size $\gamma_t$. And because the rate of creative destruction is exactly the rate at which such innovations take place, the aggregate growth rate of the productivity index $Q_t$ is proportional to the aggregate rate of creative destruction and given by (see Appendix A.2)

$$g_t(\alpha) \equiv \frac{\dot{Q}_t}{Q_t} = \ln(\gamma_t) \times \tau_t(\alpha).$$

This expression highlights the relationship between delegation and aggregate growth: in our model, more efficient delegation increases aggregate growth through its effect on expansion and entry and hence creative destruction. Whether this leads to persistent differences in growth rates across countries depends on the step size $\gamma_t$. As far as the process of firm dynamics is concerned, we do not have to take a stand on $\gamma_t$. The reason is that our model permits a stationary firm-size distribution even if the step size $\gamma_t$ varies over time; see Section A.3 of the Appendix where we prove this property formally. However, in order to quantify the effect of delegation on long-run productivity differences, we consider a model where $\gamma$ is endogenous and the long-run distribution of income across countries is stationary. Hence, differences in $\alpha$ between the U.S. and India will result in level differences, not growth differences; see Section 6 below.

**2.4 The Labor Market Equilibrium for Outside Managers**

To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we need to specify the supply of production workers and outside managers. To generate an upward sloping supply schedule for managerial workers, we assume that each individual is endowed with a single efficiency unit of production labor and $h$ units of managerial human capital, distributed according to $G(h)$. Individuals make their occupational choice to maximize total earnings, i.e. individual $i$ works as an outside manager if $h_i w_M > w_P$. The total supply of managerial efficiency units is therefore given by

$$H^M \left( \frac{w_P}{w_M} \right) = \int_{h \geq \frac{w_P}{w_M}} hg(h) dh,$$

where $g(h)$ is the density associated with $G(h)$.

The demand for managerial efficiency units results from firms’ optimal hiring decisions. Because of the non-homotheticity of managerial demand, larger firms delegate more intensely, and the ag-
aggregate demand for managerial inputs depends on the endogenous firm size distribution (FSD). Using the optimal hiring rule in (10), a firm with \( n \geq n^* \) products hires a total of \( nm(n) \) managerial efficiency units. As long as \( n^* > 1 \), small firms (in particular all low-type firms), do not hire outside managers, and labor market clearing requires that

\[
H^M \left( \frac{w_p}{w_M} \right) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} 1(\n \geq n^*) m(n) nF_n(a) = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} 1(\n \geq n^*) \left( \sigma \theta \left( \frac{w_M}{Y} \right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} a^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} n - \frac{T}{a} \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta-1}} F_n(a), \tag{23}
\]

where \( F_n = F^H_n + 1(n = 1)F^L \). The aggregate demand schedule on the RHS of equation (23) highlights the two margins though which managerial demand depends on the efficiency of outside managers \( a \). Holding the firm size distribution and the relative wage \( w_M/Y \) constant, aggregate demand is increasing in \( a \). In addition, because managerial demand is non-homothetic, the firm size distribution \( F_n(a) \) itself also affects managerial demand directly. Since an increase in \( a \) shifts economic activity toward large firms, which hire more managers per product, this channel is a second force making managerial hiring increasing in the efficiency of outside managers.

This direct effect of the firm size distribution also highlights why other determinants of the firm size distribution, in particular the share of low types \( \delta \) or the efficiency of innovation \( \theta \), affect managerial hiring. In economies where firms are small, outside managers will be in low demand even though their efficiency \( a \) might not be particularly small. Our quantitative exercise will take both of these forces explicitly into account. This allows us to distinguish whether managerial demand is low in India because managers are relatively unproductive or because firms in India are small for other reasons.

In our quantitative application, we assume that \( h \) is drawn from a Pareto distribution, i.e., \( G(h) = 1 - \left( \frac{\theta-1}{\sigma} H_M \right)^{\theta} \times h^{-\theta} \). Here \( H_M \) parametrizes the average level of managerial skills relative to workers, and \( \theta > 1 \) governs the heterogeneity in managerial talent. Using this functional form, the supply of managerial efficiency in (22) is given by

\[
H^M \left( \frac{w_p}{w_M} \right) = \left( \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta - 1} H_M \right)^{\theta} \left( \frac{w_M}{w_p} \right)^{\theta - 1} \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1}, \tag{24}
\]

which is increasing in the relative wage with an elasticity of \( \theta - 1 \). Moreover, holding relative wages fixed, the managerial skill supply is increasing in the average level of managerial human capital \( H_M \).

An equilibrium in our economy is then defined in the following way:

**Definition 1** Consider the environment described above. A dynamic equilibrium path is characterized by a time path of

\[
[p_h, y_h, \{V^H_t(n)\}_{n=1}^{\infty}, V^L_t, \{x_t(n)\}_{n=1}^{\infty}, z_t, w_{t,M}, w_{t,P}, \{F^H_{nt}\}_{n=1}^{\infty}, F^L_t, r_t, g_t]_{t=0}^{\infty},
\]

such that (i) \( p_h \) and \( y_h \) maximize monopoly profits in (4), (ii) the value functions \( V^H_t(n) \) and \( V^L_t \) are given by (13) and (16) (iii) the innovation rates \( x_t(n) \) are optimal and given in (14), (iv) the entry rate \( z_t \) satisfies (17), (v) \( w_{t,P} \) and \( w_{t,M} \) clear the labor market for production and managerial labor, (vi) the numbers of firms of each size \( [F^H_{nt}, F^L_t] \) are consistent with the flow equations in Section A.1 in the Appendix, (vii) the interest
rate $r_t$ satisfies the household’s Euler equation, and (viii) the aggregate productivity growth rate is consistent with (21).

### 2.5 Taking Stock

We have developed a theory to link the efficiency of outside managers to firms’ growth incentives and hence the process of firm dynamics as well as the equilibrium firm size distribution. At the heart of our model is the insight that a higher productivity of outside managers endogenously increase firms’ span of control and hence their incentives to grow large.

To summarize the effects of an increase in $\alpha$, consider Figure 3, where we depict the qualitative relationship between $\alpha$ and various equilibrium outcomes. In Panel A we show that there is a positive relationship between managerial efficiency and firms’ life-cycle growth, i.e. the size of old firms relative to entrants. This follows directly from the resulting increase in firms’ expansion incentives, in particular for large firms. This faster growth at the firm level shifts the firm-size distribution to the right so that the employment share of small firms declines (Panel B). These changes at the firm level are accompanied by changes in the labor market. In particular, the employment share of outside managers is increasing in $\alpha$ both because firms’ demand for managers increases and because the firm size distribution shifts to the right, which further increases managerial demand as large firms are manager intensive (Panel C). Finally, because firms are heterogeneous in their growth potential, an increase in $\alpha$ will also be accompanied by selection. As subsistence entrepreneurs are small in equilibrium, they do not benefit from the opportunity to hire managers. In contrast, they lose from improvements in delegation efficiency because they are less likely to survive (Panel D).

The patterns displayed in Figure 3 are qualitatively consistent with the evidence on firm dynamics in poor countries where firms are small and do not grow, subsistence producers are abundant, and outside managers are rare. Our theory highlights that the glut of small, stagnant firms in poor countries might not solely reflect frictions these firms face but also result from more productive firms not being able to overcome limits to their span of control. Improvements in the productivity of outside managers enable firms with growth potential to overcome these decreasing returns and speed up the aggregate selection process. In the remainder of this paper, we consider whether this mechanism can quantitatively account for the observed differences in the firm size distribution between the U.S. and India and whether it has important implications for differences in income per capita and welfare.

### 3 Data and Calibration Strategy

#### 3.1 Data

Our quantitative analysis uses both establishment-level and individual-level microdata. For the process of firm dynamics, we rely on data for the population of manufacturing establishments in the U.S. and India. We then combine this information with individual-level census records from

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12Recall that our model assumes that the aggregate labor supply is fixed. Since the manufacturing sector is only a part of the economy, in section 7 we explore the importance of this assumption by allow the total labor supply to adjust in response to our counterfactual exercise.
Figure 3: Taking Stock: Delegation, Selection and Firm Dynamics

Panel A: Life cycle growth

Panel B: Employment share of small firms

Panel C: Managerial employment share

Panel D: Share of subsistence firms

Notes: The figure summarizes the qualitative implications of changes in the productivity of outside managers \( \alpha \) for firms’ life cycle growth (Panel A), the employment share of small firms (Panel B), the managerial employment share (Panel C) and the equilibrium share of low-type firms (Panel D).

both countries to measure managerial employment. Here we briefly describe the main data sources. A detailed description is contained in Section B.1 of the Appendix.

Establishment level data for the U.S. and India: We calibrate our model to data for the manufacturing sector of the U.S. and India. For the case of the U.S. we rely on publicly available data from the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS). The BDS is provided by the U.S. Census Bureau and compiled from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), which draws on the U.S. Census Bureau’s Business Registry to provide longitudinal data for each establishment with paid employees. We focus on the data from 2012.

For India, we follow Hsieh and Klenow (2014) and Hsieh and Olken (2014) and use the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and the National Sample Survey (NSS).\(^\text{13}\) The ASI focuses on the formal sector and covers all establishments employing ten or more workers using electric power or employing twenty or more workers without electric power. We complement the ASI with data from the

\(^{13}\)Recently, Rotemberg and White (2017) argued that the data in the U.S. and India differ in terms of their data cleaning strategies. These concerns are less relevant for our study because we only rely on sample averages of the reported employment data and do not utilize information on any higher moments, which are important for the measurement of misallocation. However, we did recalculate the moments, which we use to identify our model after dropping firms in the top and bottom 2% of the employment distribution (both in the population of firms and conditional on age) and found that this did not affect the moments much.
NSS, which, every five years, surveys a random sample of the population of manufacturing establishments without the minimum size requirement of the ASI. We merge these two datasets using the sampling weights provided in the data and focus on the year 2010, which is the latest year for which both datasets are available. Because the Indian data is collected at the level of the establishment, our benchmark analysis will focus on individual establishments. We will conduct robustness checks using firm-level data for the U.S. in Section 7.

Table 1 contains some basic descriptive statistics about the distribution of establishment size in the U.S. and India. The importance of large firms varies enormously between these two countries. In the U.S., two-thirds of manufacturing employment is concentrated in establishments with at least 100 employees, and only one-third of the establishments have fewer than four employees. In India, more than nine out of ten establishments have fewer than four employees, and they account for more than half of aggregate employment.

**Table 1: Establishment Size and Managerial Employment in the U.S. and India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment Size</th>
<th>Average empl.</th>
<th>1 - 4 employees</th>
<th>≥ 100 employees</th>
<th>Empl. share of outside managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Empl. share</td>
<td>Share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>93.0%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table contains summary statistics from the firm size distribution in the U.S. and India. The U.S. data come from the BDS in 2012, the data for India from the NSS and ASI in 2010. In the last column, we report the share of outside managers, i.e. all workers who are classified as managers according to the occupation classification ISCO and who are hired as wage workers. This data stems from IPUMS.

**Data on Managerial Employment:** To measure managerial employment for both the U.S. and India, we rely on national census data provided by the IPUMS project. We focus on male workers in the manufacturing industry working in private-sector jobs. We always use the most recent data available, which is 2004 in the case of India and 2010 in the case of the U.S. Our theory stresses the importance of outside managers. We therefore classify employees as managers if they are assigned the occupational code “Legislator, Senior official and manager” and they are hired as wage workers instead of being, for example, family members of the firms’ owners or the employer themselves. As shown in the last column of Table 1, in the U.S. roughly 12.4% of employees satisfy this criterion. In India, less than 2% are employed as outside managers.

Insisting on outside managers is important. For the case of the U.S., roughly 14% of the labor force is classified as managers according to their occupational code. The majority, namely 90%, are wage workers, hence outside managers in the sense of our theory. This is very different in the case of India, where, conditional on working in a managerial occupation, only 12% of individuals are wage workers, and the remainder of individuals working in managerial occupations are either entrepreneurs themselves or unpaid family members. The latter is consistent with the findings in Bloom et al. (2013), who also find that Indian firms acquire managerial services mostly from their
owners or close family members. This pattern is very much the exception in the U.S.

A key property of our model is that firms’ demand for outside managers is non-homothetic: larger firms have higher managerial employment shares. In Table 2 we show that such non-homotheticities are the norm in the Indian firm-level data as the employment share of managers is sharply increasing in size. While firms with 1-4 employees have essentially no managerial personnel, firms with more than 100 employees have managerial employment shares exceeding 10%. The aggregate managerial share as measured from the firm-level data is 2.8%, which is quite consistent with the 1.7% reported in IPUMS. Below we show that the predictions of our model are also quantitatively in line with Table 2.14

In the second row, we report the share of firms which stem from the ASI as opposed to the NSS. For the economy as a whole, 1% of firms are in the ASI. As expected, firms in the ASI are much larger - even among firms with 10-19 employees, the share of ASI firms is 16% and hence 16 times as large as in the population as a whole. Hence, managerial demand stems mostly from large, formal firms, which, through the lens of our theory, are more likely to be high-type firms.

Table 2: Non-homothetic managerial demand in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of employees</th>
<th>Full Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-999</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1000</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of managers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of ASI firms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Notes: The table reports the share of managerial employment and the share of ASI firms among firms of a given size (columns 1 - 7) and for the aggregate economy (last column). The data combines the NSS data from 1995 and the ASI data from 1999. These are the only years where both datasets report managerial hiring. In later years, this variable is missing in the NSS.

3.2 Identification and Calibration

To credibly identify the productivity of outside managers $\alpha$, we independently calibrate our model to the Indian and U.S. data. By allowing the key parameters of our model to differ between these economies, we capture various alternative mechanisms affecting the process of firm dynamics in a parsimonious way. This is important because the firm size distribution itself is an important determinant of managerial demand, even holding $\alpha$ constant - see (23).

By allowing high types’ growth potential $\theta$ to vary across countries, we capture - in a reduced form way - differences in capital market efficiency which might prevent Indian firms from investing (see, for instance, Cole et al., 2016), size-dependent policies, whereby Indian firms might be subject to steeper (implicit) tax rates (see, for example, Hsieh and Klenow, 2014, Guner et al., 2008, Ulyssea, 2018, and Bento and Restuccia, 2017), or product market frictions, which might be more severe in India (see, for example, Foster et al., 2016, Gourio and Rudanko, 2014, and Perla, 2016). Similarly, inefficiencies in the allocation of start-up capital or frictions in the labor market might induce more subsistence firms to enter in India. If this is an important aspect of the data, we will estimate low-

14We use the managerial employment share from IPUMS as our main calibration target to ensure that the classification is consistent between the U.S. and India.
type firms in India to be plentiful upon entry ($\delta_{\text{IND}} < \delta_{\text{US}}$). Finally, the Indian economy might be characterized by higher entry costs due to bureaucratic red tape ($\theta_{\text{IND}}^E < \theta_{\text{US}}^E$). Our estimation allows all of these aspects to be correlated with the productivity of outside managers $\alpha$ in an arbitrary way.

**Identification**

Our model has 13 parameters:

$$\Omega \equiv \{\alpha, \sigma, T, \mu_M, \theta, \theta, E, \xi, \delta, \beta, \gamma_t, \rho\},$$

where

- **Management**
- **Firm dynamics**
- **Macro**

Five parameters are directly related to the demand for and supply of managerial services: the productivity of outside managers ($\alpha$), the managerial output elasticity ($\sigma$), the owners’ own human capital ($T$), and the distribution of managerial skills ($\mu_M$ and $\theta$). The process of firm dynamics is captured by the expansion and entry efficiencies ($\theta$ and $\theta^E$), the convexity of the cost function $\zeta$, the share of high-type entrants ($\delta$), and the difference in type-specific creative destruction rates ($\beta$). Finally, the remaining “macro” parameters include the innovation step size ($\gamma_t$) and the patience of the representative household ($\rho$).

As highlighted above, we estimate most of these parameters separately for the U.S. and India. We restrict three parameters to be the same across countries: $\rho$, $\zeta$ and $\theta$. Note also that we allow the innovation step size $\gamma_t$ to be country-specific and time-varying. In particular, we allow for the Indian economy to be along a transition path, i.e. catching-up with the U.S. As far as the firm size distributions are concerned, we estimate the parameters under the assumption that the distributions are stationary. As we show formally in Section A.3 of the Appendix, our model implies that the firm-size distribution will remain stationary during the transition, i.e. despite the fact that the aggregate economy has not reached a BGP yet.\(^{15}\) This allows us to calibrate all parameters independently of $\gamma_t$. In Section 6 we describe in detail how we discipline the evolution of $\gamma_t$.

We fix two of the parameters exogenously ($\rho$ and $\zeta$) and calibrate the remaining parameters by minimizing the distance between several empirical moments and their model counterparts.\(^{16}\) In particular, let $M^E$ denote the vector of $S$ empirical moments and $M(\Omega)$ denote the vector of model-simulated moments. We then chose $\Omega$ to minimize the absolute relative deviation between the model and data, i.e. we solve

$$\min_{\Omega} \sum_{m=1}^S \frac{|M_m^E - M_m(\Omega)|}{|M_m^E|}.$$ 

Even though our parameters are calibrated jointly, below we provide a heuristic description of the relationship between the parameters and specific moments. In Appendix B.2, we give a more formal identification discussion and verify these relationships numerically using a sensitivity matrix.

\(^{15}\)Empirically, the firm size distribution in India is relatively stable over time, despite the fast convergence in income per capita (see Section OA-2.2 in the Online-Appendix).

\(^{16}\)As we do not have data on spending on innovation, we do not attempt to estimate the curvature of the expansion cost function, $\zeta$. Instead we follow the microeconomic literature, whose estimates imply a quadratic cost function, i.e., $\zeta = 0.5$. See Akcigit and Kerr (2018) and Acemoglu et al. (2018), who discuss this evidence in more detail. In Section 7 we provide a battery of robustness checks. We set the discount rate $\rho$ equal to 5%.
where we report the elasticity of each moment used in the internal calibration with respect to the parameters of the model (see Table 12 in Section B.5 in the Appendix).

**Firm Dynamics: Identifying \( \theta, \delta, \beta \) and \( \theta_E \).** The expansion efficiency \( \theta \) is mostly identified from the profile of firms’ life-cycle growth. This is seen in Panel A of Figure 4, where we depict average employment by age for different values of \( \theta \), holding all other parameters fixed: the higher \( \theta \), the faster firms grow conditional on survival. To identify the share of high-type producers \( \delta \), we focus on the age-profile of exit rates conditional on firm size. Without type heterogeneity, the likelihood of exit would be independent of age conditional on size. In the data, however, such conditional exit rates are strongly decreasing in firm age (see e.g., Haltiwanger et al. (2013)). Through the lens of our model, this pattern is rationalized through endogenous selection, whereby the share of low-type firms within a given cohort declines as the cohort ages. This is shown in Panel B of Figure 4, where we display the exit rate of small firms by age for different values of \( \delta \). Without any heterogeneity, i.e. \( \delta = 1 \), the conditional exit hazard is flat. The parameter \( \beta \), which determines how quickly low-type firms lose market share, is identified from the aggregate employment share of old firms. Intuitively, as high-type firms are older on average, the aggregate size of old cohorts is informative about this parameter. Finally, the entry efficiency \( \theta_E \) is identified from the aggregate entry rate.

![Figure 4: Identification of \( \delta \) and \( \theta \)](image)

**Notes:** The left panel shows the employment life-cycle, i.e. average employment by age, for different values of \( \theta \). The right panel shows the exit rate of one-product firms by age for different values of \( \delta \). The black line depicts the U.S. calibration (i.e., \( \theta_{US} = 0.198 \) in the left panel and \( \delta_{US} = 0.62 \) in the right panel). The other lines are obtained by varying \( \theta \) (left panel) or \( \delta \) (right panel) while keeping the rest of the parameters constant.

**Management: Identifying \( \alpha, \mu_M, \sigma, \vartheta \) and \( T \).** As the productivity of outside managers \( \alpha \) directly affects firms’ managerial demand (see (23)), it is mainly identified from the aggregate managerial employment shares reported in Table 1. In particular, the lower share of outside managers in India implies – all else equal – that \( \alpha_{IND} < \alpha_{US} \). As we discuss in Section B.2 in the Appendix, by choice of units for managerial skills, all allocations in the model only depend on \( \mu_M \times \alpha \). To separately identify...
from the supply of managerial skills $\mu_M$, we require variation in the demand for managerial skills holding managerial human capital fixed. Ideally we would observe the same manager working with both the U.S. and the Indian $\alpha$. We mimic this experiment by using data from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS), which contains information about the pre- and post-migration occupations of recent immigrants to the U.S. This data has recently been used by Hendricks and Schoellman (2017). In Section B.4 in the Appendix, we show in detail how we can use this information to identify $\mu_M$ and $\alpha$ separately. Intuitively, Indian immigrants to the U.S. are almost as likely to work in managerial occupations as U.S. residents. However, they are much more likely to have worked in managerial jobs prior to emigrating. This implies that the average managerial human capital of the non-selected, non-migrant Indian population is lower than in the U.S. These two moments separately identify $\alpha$ and $\mu_M$ and allow us to perform our counterfactual, where we change the efficiency of managers within firms ($\alpha$) while holding the supply of managerial skills constant.

We identify the "management elasticity" $\sigma$ from the relationship between firm profits and managerial efficiency $e$. Using the endogenous profit function in (11) and the fact that - conditional on hiring outside managers - the optimal amount of managerial efficiency is given by $e = (\alpha \sigma / \omega_M)^{1/\sigma}$, total scaled profits $\tilde{\pi}(n)$ can be written as

$$\tilde{\pi}(n) = (1 - \sigma) e^{\sigma n} + \sigma T e^{-(1-\sigma)}. \quad (25)$$

Equation (25) highlights that $\sigma$ governs the relationship between managerial services $e$ and firm profits. In fact, if firms’ managerial demand was homothetic, i.e. if $T$ was equal to zero, $\sigma$ would exactly be the elasticity of profits with respect to $e$ holding firm size $n$ constant. In addition, $\sigma$ also determines how firms’ expansion incentives respond to changes in managerial efficiency: if $\sigma$ is small, changes in $e$ will have limited effects on firms’ profits and their incentives to grow large. If $\sigma$ is large, firms’ expansion incentives will respond strongly.

An ideal way to estimate $\sigma$ is to exploit exogenous variation in managerial inputs at the firm-level and subsequent changes in firm profitability. We therefore estimate $\sigma$ via indirect inference based on the experimental evidence on the relationship between management practices and firm performance from Bloom et al. (2013). The authors provided free consulting on the efficacy of 38 management practices to a set of randomly chosen textile establishments in India. These practices, which are standard in U.S. firms, centered on factory operations, formalized quality control and inventory practices, and changes in human resource management like performance-based incentive pay. Using the random assignment of this managerial intervention, Bloom et al. (2013) estimate the treatment effect of managerial practices on subsequent output growth using the specification

$$\ln \text{Output}_{i,t} = \beta \times \text{TREAT}_{i,t} + f_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (26)$$

where $\text{TREAT}_{i,t}$ takes the value of one for the treatment plants starting one month after the end of the intervention period and $f_i$ are a full set of plant dummies. They estimate (26) at the weekly level and find a treatment effect of 9% for a horizon of 100 weeks.

It is this treatment effect which we use as an "identified moment" to identify $\sigma$ in our structural model (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018). To implement this experiment in our model, we need to
take a stand on what the treatment means in our theory, i.e. how we translate the ordinal nature of
the treatment into a cardinal increase in managerial services $e$ among treated firms. Our strategy is
as follows. In our model, firms’ managerial environment is fully summarized by their managerial
services $e$. We therefore relate firm $f$’s optimally chosen managerial services $e_f$ to the share of
practices which firm $f$ chooses to adopt and which we denote by $MP_f$. Note that like $e$ in our
theory, the adoption decision of the managerial practices in the experiment was also endogenous.
In particular, the experimental intervention provided management consulting but left the eventual
choice of which practices to adopt to the firms. Bloom et al. (2013, p. 22) explicitly report that the
adoption decision "was endogenous and it presumably varied with the cost-benefit calculation for
each practice".

To link the unobservable $e_f$ to the observable $MP_f$, we consider the following measurement
equation: $e_f = vMP_f^\varphi$, where $v$ and $\varphi$ are positive parameters. Letting $MP_{IND}^{Treat}$ be the share of
managerial practices adopted by Indian firms after the treatment and $MP_{IND}$ be the share among
control plants, this implies that

$$
e_{IND}^{Treat} = \left( \frac{MP_{IND}^{Treat}}{MP_{IND}} \right)^\varphi
$$

For a given parameter $\varphi$, we can therefore infer the change in managerial service $e$ due to the
treatment from the change in managerial practices $MP$. To identify $\varphi$, we use data on differences in
managerial practices between the U.S. and India and the model-implied differences in managerial
services, $e_{IND}$ and $e_{US}$. In particular, letting $MP_{US}$ denote the share of practices adopted by U.S.
firms, our measurement equation implies that $e_{IND} = \left( \frac{MP_{IND}}{MP_{US}} \right)^\varphi$. Hence, we can map the observed
change in managerial practices among treatment firms to change in $e$ as

$$
\ln \left( \frac{e_{IND}^{Treat}}{e_{IND}} \right) = \varphi \times \ln \left( \frac{MP_{IND}^{Treat}}{MP_{IND}} \right) = \frac{\ln (e_{IND}/e_{US})}{\ln (MP_{IND}/MP_{US})} \times \ln \left( \frac{MP_{IND}^{Treat}}{MP_{IND}} \right).
$$

(27)

In the microdata of the experiment, we find that $MP_{IND} = 0.25$, i.e. prior to the treatment, Indian
firms adopt roughly 1/4 of the managerial practices. The treatment increases the adoption rate to
$MP_{IND}^{Treat} = 0.63$. Given that all of these practices "have been standard for decades in the developed
world" (Bloom et al., 2013, p. 43), we assume that firms in the U.S. adopt all these practices, i.e.
$MP_{US} = 1$. We can then use (27) to calculate $e_{IND}^{Treat}$ for a given calibration of our model, which
implies particular equilibrium values for firms’ managerial services in India ($e_{IND}$) and the U.S.
($e_{US}$).17

As we describe in detail in Section B.3 in the Appendix, our implementation takes the endo-
geneity of $e_{IND}^{Treat}$ explicitly into account.18 Recall that the total amount of managerial services $e$
depends on the number of outside managers firms choose to hire ($m$) - see (7). We therefore have

17To give a concrete example, our baseline calibration implies that Indian firms utilize only 73% as many managerial
services as firms in the U.S., i.e. $e_{IND}/e_{US} = 0.73$. This implies that $e_{IND}^{Treat}/e_{IND} = 1.23$, i.e. we infer that the endogenous
adoption of managerial practices from 0.25 to 0.63 corresponds to an increase in managerial efficiency in treatment firms
by 23%.

18There, we also provide additional corroborating evidence using the reported management scores from Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007) (which are available both for firms in the U.S. and for firms in India pre-treatment) for our assumption
that $MP_{US} = 1$. 

22
to take a stand on how the experiment induced treatment firms to increase their \( e \), i.e. which structural parameter changed. In line with the intervention which provided information on how to use such managerial practices to increase the overall efficiency of managerial resources, we model the treatment as an increase in the productivity of managerial services, i.e. \( \xi e(m) \), and choose \( \xi \) such that \( \xi e(m_{\text{Treat}}) \) coincides with the value implied by (27), where \( m_{\text{Treat}} \) denotes the optimal choice of outside managers after the treatment. In Section B.3 in the Appendix we show that \( \xi \) is given by \( \xi = \left( e_{\text{Treat}} / e_{\text{IND}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \). Importantly, we keep all general equilibrium variables constant in order to implement a partial equilibrium analysis consistent with the experiment.

We then relate this increase in managerial services to the resulting profits to estimate \( \sigma \). Specifically, we take 50 firms from the very top of the firm size distribution of our calibrated Indian economy (consistent with the sample selection in Bloom et al. (2013)), treat them with the management intervention as described above, simulate their evolution for 100 weeks, and then run (26) in the model-generated data. While Bloom et al. (2013) estimate (26) using physical output as a measure of firm performance, we focus on total profits as the dependent variable in our model counterpart. We do so because profits are at the heart of our theory to link managerial services to firm performance.

Because the experiment was only conducted for firms in India, this strategy forces us to assume that \( \sigma \) is common across countries. Because of the importance of this parameter, we also implement a complementary identification strategy in Section 7 which does not rely on the experimental evidence at all but uses more standard accounting data. The standard intuition from a constant elasticity production function suggests that the output elasticity should be related relative cost shares. The same intuition is true in our model: the higher \( \sigma \), the larger the share of managerial compensation relative to profits. More specifically, our model implies that

\[
\frac{w_{\text{Mnm}}(n)}{\Pi(n)} = \frac{\sigma}{1 - \sigma} \left( \frac{Tw_{\text{M}}}{\sigma a \Pi(n)} \right),
\]

where \( w_{\text{Mnm}} \) and \( \Pi(n) \) denote total managerial payments and profits respectively. Note that if firms had to rely only on outside managers, i.e. if \( T = 0 \), the demand for outside managers would be homothetic and \( \sigma \) would exactly reflect the relative compensation share. In our model, this mapping is slightly more complicated, but (28) shows that the managerial compensation share is directly affected by \( \sigma \). Because we can measure this moment both for the U.S. and India, this approach allows us estimate \( \sigma \) separately for both countries. As we discuss in Section 7, both of these approaches lead to similar results. In particular, the estimates for \( \sigma \) are almost identical between the U.S. and India and only slightly lower then the estimates implied by (26).

Finally, to identify the dispersion of the managerial skill distribution, \( \vartheta \), we note that it can be directly calibrated to match the dispersion in managerial earnings. In particular, the model implies that the variance of log managerial earnings is given by \( \vartheta^{-2} \). Finally, the owner’s time endowment \( T \) is intimately related to the need for managerial delegation and hence determines the non-homotheticity of managerial demand. We use two moments which are informative about this aspect of the data: the extensive margin of managerial hiring, i.e. the share of firms who hire
outside managers, and the entrepreneurial profit share, which is given by

\[
\frac{\text{Aggregate Profits}}{\text{Total Sales}} = \frac{\sum_n \Pi(n) F_n}{Y} = \sum_n \tilde{\pi}(n) F_n,
\]  

(29)

where \(F_n = F_n^H + \mathbb{1}(n = 1)F_n^L\) is the number of firms with \(n\) products and \(\tilde{\pi}(n)\) is given in (11).

4 Estimation Results

In this section we discuss our estimation results. Section 4.1 contains the structural parameters and targeted moments. In Section 4.2 we show that our model is also consistent with a variety of non-targeted moments. Finally, in Section 4.3 we discuss the model’s implications for the differences in creative destruction and selection between the U.S. and India.

4.1 Calibrated Parameters and Targeted Moments

Tables 3 and 4 contain the calibrated parameters and the targeted moments. For convenience, Table 3 also reports the main target for the respective parameter even though the parameters are calibrated jointly. For the U.S. we estimate 7 parameters, for India we estimate 8 parameters. We estimate these parameters using 8 moments for the U.S. and 9 moments in India.

**Table 3: Estimated Parameters for the U.S. and India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Interpretation</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\theta)</td>
<td>Expansion efficiency</td>
<td>Employment life-cycle</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\delta)</td>
<td>Share of high types</td>
<td>Exit profile by age (cond. on size)</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\beta)</td>
<td>Relative creative destruction</td>
<td>Empl. share of old firms</td>
<td>4.153</td>
<td>2.741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\theta_E)</td>
<td>Entry efficiency</td>
<td>Entry rate</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha)</td>
<td>Productivity of outside managers</td>
<td>Managerial employment share</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\mu_M)</td>
<td>Average managerial human capital</td>
<td>Occupational sorting by immigrants</td>
<td>1.000†</td>
<td>0.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\theta)</td>
<td>Dispersion of managerial human capital</td>
<td>Var of ln managerial earnings</td>
<td>1.429†</td>
<td>1.429*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma)</td>
<td>Managerial output elasticity</td>
<td>Treatment effect of Bloom et al. (2013)</td>
<td>0.463†</td>
<td>0.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(T)</td>
<td>Entrepreneurial time endowment</td>
<td>Average entrepreneurial profit share &amp; Empl. share of no-manager firms</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel A. Internal Calibration**

**Managerial Environment**

**Panel B. External Calibration**

\(\zeta\) Convexity of expansion costs 0.50 0.50
\(\rho\) Discount rate 0.05 0.05

Notes: Table reports the parameter values that yield the model moments reported in Table 4. We denote normalized parameters by "†" and parameters which we do not estimate by "*".

Consider first Table 3. The first two rows show that entrants in the U.S. economy are about six times as likely to be high types \((\delta_{US} \approx 6 \times \delta_{IND})\) and that such firms in the U.S. are around 3.5 times as efficient in expanding into new markets as their Indian counterparts \((\theta_{US} \approx 3.5 \times \theta_{IND})\). In
contrast, the entry technology is only slightly more efficient in the U.S. Additionally, we estimate that $\beta > 1$, which implies that low-type firms are subject to relatively higher probabilities of creative destruction, and that this asymmetry is more pronounced in the U.S. Economically, we find these estimates plausible in that they capture additional reasons why firms in India might not expand (e.g. due to the presence of credit constraints or size-dependent policies) or why unproductive firms are abundant upon entry (e.g. because of low opportunity costs of entrepreneurship in India).

The next panel contains our estimates of the delegation environment. Our calibration implies that outside managers in the U.S. are about twice as productive as in India ($\alpha_{US} \approx 2 \times \alpha_{IND}$). Note that this low estimate of $\alpha_{IND}$ is conditional on the other determinants of the firm size distribution, i.e. $\theta$, $\delta$ and $\theta_E$. This implies that these other mechanisms are not able to explain both the differences in firm dynamics and managerial hiring simultaneously.

As with the productivity of outside managers within firms, we also estimate that managers in the U.S. have more human capital, i.e. $\mu_{MUS} > \mu_{MIND}$. This is inferred from the fact that the share of managers among Indian immigrants in the U.S. is 12.9% (hence very similar to the overall manager share in the U.S.) but they are much more likely to work as managers prior to migrating compared to the Indian population. Therefore, the unselected population in India has a comparative disadvantage in managerial occupations.

### Table 4: Moments for the U.S. and India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S. Data</th>
<th>U.S. Model</th>
<th>India Data</th>
<th>India Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firm Dynamics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry rate (%)</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>5.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit profile by age (cond. on size)</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment life-cycle</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment share of old firms (%)</td>
<td>8.10</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>6.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Managerial Environment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial employment share (%)</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment effect from Bloom et al. (2013) (%)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>8.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment share of no-manager firms (%)</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative managerial share of Indian migrants</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average entrepreneurial profit share (%)</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance of ln manager earnings</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.45*</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Table reports both the data moments and the corresponding moments in the model for the U.S. and India. We define “old” and “young” firms as firms of age 21 - 25 years and 1-5 years respectively. We define small firms as firms with 1-4 employees in the data and with a single product in the model. See Section B.1 in the Appendix for details. “*” denotes that the moment is not targeted in the calibration.

In Table 4 we report the targeted moments – for the model and the data. We start with the U.S. calibration. As seen in the first panel, the model is able to rationalize most empirical moments. In particular, it matches the observed employment life cycle and the differences in exit rates, whereby small young firms, which exit at a rate of 21% per year, are around 1.5 times as likely to exit as small old firms, which have an exit rate of 14%. Furthermore, the model also matches the aggregate share
of managerial workers reported in Table 1. The model underestimates the aggregate employment share of old firms as well as the share of firms without any outside managers.\footnote{One reason why the model predicts slightly too few old firms is that in our model growth is only driven by the extensive margin of adding products. Hence, the process of growth and the resulting exit hazard are tightly linked. If we allowed for growth on the intensive margin (e.g., through quality innovations within existing product lines as in \cite{Akcigit2018,Garcia-Macia2019}), we could break this link. As for the share of firms without any managerial personnel, our calibration implies that the delegation cutoff in the U.S., \( n^* \), is smaller than unity.}

This is similar for the calibration to the Indian economy. The model is again able to match the data well. It replicates the essentially flat life-cycle of Indian establishments, the low share of aggregate managerial employment, and the fact that, in contrast to the U.S., young establishments exit almost at the same rate as old establishments. As is the case for the U.S. calibration, the model slightly underestimates the share of old firms in the economy.\footnote{At first glance it might be surprising that old firms, i.e., firms of ages 21-25, have roughly the same aggregate employment share in the U.S. and India. The reason is that the aggregate employment share of very old firms is much higher in the U.S. In the U.S. (India) the share of firms older than 25 years is 55\% (20\%). See Sections OA-2.1 and OA-2.2 in the Online Appendix for details.} Also note that firms in India have a much higher share of entrepreneurial profits compared to firms in the U.S. This is due to the fact that most firms in India are small so that most of their sales are attributed as entrepreneurial compensation for the provision of the fixed factor \( T \).

Because the shape parameter \( \theta \) is directly linked to the dispersion of log managerial earnings, we match this moment directly. Empirically, we target the distribution of residual log managerial earnings in the manufacturing sector after controlling for a quadratic in age and industry fixed effects within the manufacturing sector. Although we assume \( \theta \) to be identical across countries for simplicity, Table 4 shows that the dispersion of log managerial earnings in India is essentially the same as in the U.S. Note also that our distributional assumption of managerial human capital implies that the average wage of managers relative to production workers within a country is given by \( \theta / (\theta - 1) \). When we look at this implication in the micro-data, we find that managers in the U.S. (India) earn a premium of 0.54 log points (0.78 log points). Both of these are lower than the model-implied premium given the estimate of \( \theta \), which is 1.19 log points. Because \( \theta \) plays the role of a labor supply elasticity, we prefer to target the dispersion in wages, which is more directly related to the scope of selection. In Section 7 we discuss how different assumptions about this supply elasticity affect our results.

Importantly, our model is able to replicate the estimated treatment effect reported in Bloom et al. (2013) quite well - our best fit to the data generates a treatment effect of 8.3\% instead of the observed 9\%. We think this is an important aspect of our methodology. Because we are interested in quantifying the aggregate effects of changes in the productivity of outside managers, we want to ensure that our model is quantitatively consistent with well-identified microeconomic evidence on the dynamic effects of changes in management practices at the firm-level. Matching the estimated treatment effect requires an estimate of \( \sigma \) of around 0.46. As discussed in detail above, for our baseline analysis we restrict \( \sigma \) to be the same across countries. In Section 7 we discuss an alternative strategy where we estimate \( \sigma \) from accounting data and allow it to be country-specific.
4.2 Non-targeted Moments

Our model also performs well in matching a variety of non-targeted moments. In particular, we focus on the non-homotheticity of managerial demand, firms’ survival hazards and the number of products firms sell. Additionally, we also discuss some qualitative patterns in the delegation decisions of Indian firms based on a regression analysis and compare them to the predictions of our theory.

Non-homothetic Managerial Demand A key mechanism of our model is that large firms endogenously increase their span of control by hiring outside managers. Hence, the share of managerial employment increases in firm size. In Table 2 above we already showed that this is qualitatively borne out in the data. Figure 5 shows that our model is also quantitatively consistent with the relationship between managerial employment shares and firm size. To compare the model and the data, we focus on quantiles of the firm size distribution. In particular, going from right to left, we plot the share of managerial employment among the largest 0.1%, the largest 1%, the largest 5% of firms, and so on. Hence, by going from right to left, we trace out the average managerial share as a function of the firm size distribution. At the far left, we report the share among the 100% largest firms, which is simply the entire sample of firms. Hence, in the data the managerial share is the sample average of 2.8% (see Table 2), and in the model it is 1.7%, our calibration target from the IPUMS data. Figure 5 shows that our model replicates the "delegation-firm size" relationship observed in India very well, even though we only targeted the aggregate managerial employment share and the extensive margin of managerial hiring, i.e. the fact that 77.5% of firms in India do not hire any managers.

Figure 5: Managerial Demand By Firm Size

Notes: This figures shows the employment share of managers among firms in the top $x\%$ of the firm-size distribution for $x = 0.1\%, 1\%, 5\%, \ldots$. We report the data using a black dashed line and the model using a red solid line. See also Table 2 for a summary of the data.
Survival Hazards  In Figure 6 we compare our model to two measures of the degree of selection. In Panel A we depict the survival rate, i.e. the size of a given age cohort relative to the entering cohort. The rate of firm survival is reasonably similar in the U.S. and India – both in the data and in the model.\(^{21}\) In Panel B we show the share of small firms by age (relative to their share among young firms). While the share of small firms in the U.S. declines to 40% by the age of 25, the vast majority of old firms in India are still small. Our model again replicates these patterns reasonably well.

![Figure 6: Firm Selection in the U.S. and India](image)

**Notes:** Panel A depicts the share of firms by age relative to the share of firms in the youngest age category. Panel B shows the share of small firms by age. We show the data using solid lines and the model using dashed lines. In the U.S. small firms are firms with 1 - 4 employees. In India small firms are firms with one employee.

The Product Line Distribution  In our model, a firm is a collection of product lines. Our calibration focuses only on employment data to measure firm size and does not use data at the product level. Both the U.S. and the Indian data, however, contain information on the number of 5-digit product codes in which individual firms are operating.\(^{22}\) In Figure 7 we plot the distribution of firm-level product counts in the data and the model. Our model matches this aspect of the data remarkably well, despite the fact that this moment is not targeted. In particular, the vast number of Indian firms indeed produce only a single product.

Qualitative Predictions on Delegation in the Indian Micro Data  Finally, we can look at some qualitative predictions of our theory.\(^{23}\) Our theory implies that firms do not hire outside managers

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\(^{21}\)As for the category of 26+ firms: Note that this is the accumulated stock of surviving firms, who are older than 26 years. Hence, even though the U.S. exit rates are only slightly lower than those in India, the small differences in the flow of exit add up to a sizable difference in the stock of old firms. See also Figures 2 and 3 in Hsieh and Klenow (2014), who show that exit rates are only slightly lower in the U.S. but that the aggregate employment share of old firms is vastly larger in the U.S.

\(^{22}\)The data for the U.S. firms come from Acemoglu et al. (2018)

\(^{23}\)See Section B.6 for the details of the empirical analysis. There we also provide an explicit derivation of the regression equations based on our theory.
if their size falls short of the delegation cutoff (see (9)), i.e.

\[ m_j = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad n < n^*(\alpha) \equiv T \left( \frac{\omega_M}{\sigma \alpha} \right)^\frac{1}{1-\sigma}. \]

Hence, firms are more likely to delegate if (i) firm size \( n \) increases, (ii) the productivity of outside managers \( \alpha \) improves, and (iii) the owner’s inelastically provided managerial human capital \( T \) is smaller.

To take this prediction to the data, we follow Bloom et al. (2013, p. 4), who argue that for Indian textile firms, “managerial time was constrained by the number of male family members. Non-family members were not trusted by firm owners with any decision-making power, and as a result firms did not expand beyond the size that could be managed by close (almost always male) family members.” Hence, we take the size of the entrepreneur’s family as a proxy for \( T \). Moreover, we use regional variation in trust within India to proxy for variation in \( \alpha \). The latter is calculated from the World Values Survey as the share of people providing the answer “Most people can be trusted” within the Indian state where the firm is located. This is the most common measure of trust used in the literature (see for instance La Porta et al. (1997)).

More specifically, we regress firms’ managerial hiring decision on firm size, household size and regional trust in 22 Indian states. We always control for the market of a firm, i.e. whether or not the firm is urban or rural, firm age, state-level GDP per capita, and 2-digit sector fixed effects. Due to space constraints, we only report the estimated equation; the full analysis can be found in Appendix B.6. We find that:

\[
\mathbb{1}(\text{Firm hires managers}) = 0.039 \times \text{Firm Size} - 0.003 \times \text{Family Size} + 0.013 \times \text{Trust},
\]

where “Firm Size” and “Family Size” are the logarithms of the number of employees and household members, respectively. The results show that, as predicted by the theory, firm size and regional trust correlate positively, whereas family size correlates negatively, with the probability of hiring an
outside manager.

Our model also has implications for the relationship between family size and firm size. In our model managerial resources within the family, $T$, are the constraining factor for firm size. This constraint, however, is less important, the higher the productivity of outside managers $\alpha$. Hence, while family size should be a predictor of firm size, the effect should be particularly strong in regions where trust, and hence the possibility of delegation, is less developed. We can test this prediction from the interaction between trust and family size. This also allows us to include a full set of state-fixed effects in the regression to control for all characteristics (including the level of trust) which are constant within Indian states. As before, we also control for the location of the firm (rural vs. urban), firm age and 2-digit sector fixed effects. We find that

$$\text{Firm Size} = 0.812 \times \text{Family Size} - 1.329 \times \text{Family Size} \times \text{Trust},$$

i.e. there is a positive correlation between family size and firm size which is particularly strong in low-trust regions. Through the lens of our model, this occurs due to the imperfections in delegation in those regions.

### 4.3 Firm Dynamics in the U.S. and India: Selection and Creative Destruction

Before we turn to our quantification of the role of the productivity of outside managers $\alpha$, it is useful to understand how our model interprets the observed differences between the U.S. and India. Our theory stresses that the extent of selection and the rate of creative destruction are key determinants of the process of firm dynamics. Although neither of these mechanisms is directly observable, our calibrated model allows us to compare the U.S. with India along these dimensions and hence offers a structural interpretation.

As seen in the first row of Table 5, our calibration indeed implies that the degree of creative destruction in the U.S. is almost twice as large as in India. At first glance it seems surprising that we infer large differences in creative destruction despite the fact that both aggregate entry and exit rates and firms’ survival probabilities by age are quite similar (see Figure 6). The key to reconciling these facts is to realize that the underlying distributions of firm size are vastly different in the U.S. and India. Recall that the number of exiting firms is the product of the mass of firms operating in a single market and the rate of creative destruction. Given the large share of small firms in India, the fact that exit rates are quite similar despite the fact that many firms in India are close to the exit threshold implies that creative destruction in India has to be substantially smaller. Conversely, most creative destruction in the U.S. takes place in infra-marginal markets where firms lose market share without exiting.

In the remaining rows of Table 5, we report some properties of the degree of selection. In the stationary distribution in the U.S., around 94% of firms are high-type firms (compared to 62% at the time of entry), and they have a combined employment share of 98%, as they are bigger on average. In India, even in the long-run, high-type firms account for only 34% of firms and 46% of aggregate employment. This slower weeding out process of low-type firms in India is also highlighted by the fact that even among old firms, i.e. firms of age 21-25, more than two-thirds of them are subsistence...
entrepreneurs. This is in stark contrast to the U.S., where the population of old firms is only comprised of high types.

In Figure 8 we display the strength of this "shake-out" process by showing the share of high-type firms within a cohort at different ages. Not only is the share of high-type firms in the U.S. significantly greater among the entering cohort, they also grow much faster, creating a much stronger selection force. This selection process is dampened in India: even among 30-year-old plants, more than half are low-type firms. Importantly, this lack of selection in India is not only due to there being fewer high-type firms to begin with. To illustrate this distinction, we simulate a counterfactual cohort of U.S. firms which starts with the initial type distribution of India, i.e. where the initial share of high-type firms is $\delta^{\text{IND}}$. Clearly, the differences in growth incentives of existing high-type firms in the U.S. and India are a key aspect of the selection dynamics: by the age of 15, this counterfactual cohort in the U.S. would again be populated by mostly high-type firms.

5 The Productivity of Outside Managers and Firm Dynamics

To what extent are differences in the productivity of outside managers $\alpha$ responsible for the observed differences in firm dynamics and aggregate economic performance between the U.S. and India? To answer these questions, we study a counterfactual Indian economy where we increase the productivity of outside managers from $\alpha^{\text{IND}}$ to $\alpha^{\text{US}}$ while keeping the rest of the parameters at their calibrated levels. In this section we quantify the effects on firm-level outcomes. In Section 6 we then turn to the aggregate effects and study the link between $\alpha$ and aggregate income differences.

The firm-level implications of an increase in the productivity of outside managers for the Indian economy are summarized in Table 6. In Panel A, we focus on the changes in firm expansion, entry, and creative destruction. Incumbents’ expansion incentives are much more responsive than the entry margin. While firms’ expansion rates increase by 23% on average, the entry intensity increases only by 1.7%. These differences are due to the fact that outside managers are complementary to firm size and therefore not very important for subsistence firms, which never grow. This complementarity also implies that the expansion rate of large firms is particularly responsive. At the aggregate level, however, the increase in creative destruction is much closer to the change in the entry intensity. The reason is that the market share of high-type firms in India is relatively small, so that the majority of creative destruction is accounted for by new entrants. Finally, the equilibrium

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Creative Destruction and Selection in India and the U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rate of creative destruction, $\tau$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of high-type firms upon entry ($\delta$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-run share of high-type firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-run employment share of high-type firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-run share of high-type firms among firms of age 21-25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table contains various equilibrium objects from the stationary distribution of the calibrated models. The models are parametrized according to Table 3.
Figure 8: Endogenous Selection

Notes: The figure shows the share of high-type firms by age both for the India calibration (red line) and for the U.S. calibration (black line). It also shows the counterfactual share of high-type firms by age if the initial share of high-type firms in a cohort in the U.S. is given by its Indian counterpart $\delta_{IND}$. All calibrated parameters are taken from Table 3.

Table 6: Increasing the Productivity of Outside Managers in India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Equilibrium outcomes</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>$n = 1$</th>
<th>$n = 2$</th>
<th>$n = 3$</th>
<th>$n = 4$</th>
<th>$n = 5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansion rate $x(n;\alpha)$</td>
<td>+23.55%</td>
<td>+14.35%</td>
<td>+18.59%</td>
<td>+20.21%</td>
<td>+20.91%</td>
<td>+21.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry intensity $z(\alpha)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+1.70%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative destruction $\tau$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+4.37%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of outside managers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+141%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B: Implications for firm dynamics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average firm size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of high type firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empl. share of small firms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects by age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;=5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average firm size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of small firms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the changes in various equilibrium outcomes after increasing the productivity of outside managers in India from $\alpha_{IND}$ to $\alpha_{US}$. “Small firms” are those with a single product. All changes refer to changes in the stationary distribution.

employment share of outside managers would more than double to 4.1%. Note that this is still way below the level in the U.S. To generate a managerial employment share of 12.4% (as it is in the U.S.), we would need to increase $\alpha$ to 0.93, which is more than twice of $\alpha_{US}$.

In Panel B we report the implications for the resulting process of firm-dynamics. If Indian firms could employ managers with the same productivity as firms in the U.S., average firm size would
increase by 3.5%, the share of high-type firms would increase by 3.2%, and the importance of small producers would decline by 3.1%.\textsuperscript{24}

The last two rows of Panel B show that these aggregate changes stem mostly from older firms, which are on average larger and hence more likely to rely on outside managers. Focusing first on employment, we see that the effect on average firm size mirrors the patterns with regard to firms’ expansion incentives and is increasing in age. Hence, more efficient delegation makes firms’ life-cycle steeper as the effects of higher expansion rates accumulate over time. This also implies that the share of small firms declines particularly fast among older cohorts. The reason why the effect on the life-cycle of the average firm or the share of small producers seems small compared to the increase in high types’ expansion rate, $x(n; \alpha)$, is again due to the lack of selection - as shown in Figure 8, even among old firms, the majority of firms in India are subsistence producers which have no growth potential. This remains the case even after increasing the productivity of managers to the U.S. level, limiting the increase in average firm size. The effect of $\alpha$ on the process of firm dynamics in India is therefore modest.

**The Importance of Complementarities**

The results in Table 6 highlight the interaction between the productivity of outside managers and other aspects of the economy. In particular, improvements in the efficiency of delegation are more potent if high-type firms are plentiful and those firms can expand easily. To see that this intuition is indeed correct, Table 7 presents the U.S. analogue of Table 6.\textsuperscript{25} Compared to the results for the Indian economy, we find that a decrease in the productivity of outside managers in the U.S. to the Indian level would affect firm growth much more substantially. In particular, the rate of creative destruction decreases by 25%, average firm size declines by 13%, and the employment share of small firms increases by 19%.

In contrast to the Indian economy, high-type firms in the U.S. are abundant, and their expansion costs are low. Preventing these dynamic entrepreneurs from growing affects the process of firm dynamics substantially. In contrast, transformative entrepreneurs in India are not only relatively scarce, but they also expand less efficiently. While there is a benefit to allowing these firms to sustain their expansion incentives through better delegation, the quantitative effects are much smaller. Relatedly, the effects on managerial hiring are also much larger in the U.S. If outside managers were as inefficient as their Indian counterparts, the equilibrium managerial share would decline by more than half, i.e. from 12.4% to 5.4%.

\textsuperscript{24}Our calibrated model predicts that firms in the U.S. are on average roughly 2.5 times as large as firms in India. Note that this number is not comparable to the empirical size difference of 15.8 as reported in Table 1. The reason is that in our model entrants in the U.S. start at the same size as entrants in India. Empirically, entrants in the U.S. have on average 13.7 employees, while entrants in India have 2.5. Entrants in the U.S. are therefore 5.5 times as large as entrants in India. Hence, relative to the initial size difference, U.S. firms are 15.8/5.5 = 2.8 times as large as firms in India.

\textsuperscript{25}For brevity we only report the aggregate outcomes. The results by firm size and firm age are available upon request.
Table 7: Decreasing the Productivity of Outside Managers in the U.S.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Equilibrium outcomes</th>
<th>Panel B: Implications for firm dynamics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Expansion rate</td>
<td>Average Firm Size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry intensity</td>
<td>Share of high type firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative Destruction</td>
<td>Empl. Share small firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-28.4%</td>
<td>+18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-10.2%</td>
<td>-56.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-24.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the changes in various equilibrium outcomes after decreasing the productivity of outside managers in the U.S. from $\alpha_{US}$ to $\alpha_{IND}$. "Small firms" are those with a single product. All changes refer to changes in the stationary distribution.

6 The Productivity of Outside Managers and Aggregate Income Differences

How important is the low productivity of outside managers in Indian firms for the aggregate income per capita gap between India and the U.S.?\textsuperscript{26} To answer this question we need to specify the evolution of the step size $\gamma_t$. Because we can estimate all other parameters of the model independently, our earlier results do not depend on these assumptions in any way. We consider a model where the distribution of income between the U.S. and India is stationary in the long-run, i.e. both economies grow at the same constant rate on the BGP. To achieve this, given that the equilibrium growth rate is given by $\ln(\gamma_t)\tau$ but the rate of creative destruction in India is lower than in the U.S., we assume that the Indian economy (by being technologically backward relative to the U.S.) benefits from "catch-up" growth and a higher step-size $\gamma$.

To capture this intuition in a parsimonious way, we assume that the Indian step-size $\gamma_{IND,t}$ is related to the technological gap $Q_{US,t}/Q_{IND,t}$ and given by

$$\gamma_{IND,t} = \gamma_{US} \times \left(\frac{Q_{US,t}}{Q_{IND,t}}\right)^{\lambda},$$

(30)

where $\lambda \geq 0$ and $\gamma_{US}$ is the step size for the U.S., which we assume to be constant.\textsuperscript{27} Equation (30) captures – in a reduced form way – the presence of knowledge spillovers: the lower the relative technology in India, the higher the innovation step size. If $\lambda = 0$, there are no "advantages from backwardness" (Gerschenkron, 1962). Importantly, the formulation in (30) implies that income differences between the U.S. and India will be constant in the long-run. To see this, note that along a BGP where $g = \ln(\gamma_{US})\tau_{US} = \ln(\gamma_{IND})\tau_{IND}$, equation (30) implies that

$$\ln\left(\frac{Q_{IND,t}}{Q_{US,t}}\right) = \frac{\ln\gamma_{US} - \ln\gamma_{IND}}{\lambda} = \frac{\ln\gamma_{US}}{\lambda} \times \left(\frac{\tau_{IND} - \tau_{US}}{\tau_{IND}}\right).$$

(31)

This expression highlights how the long-run distribution of technology $Q$ across countries is linked to differences in creative destruction. The lower the rate of creative destruction in India, the higher the step size $\gamma_{IND}$ has to be for the rate of growth to be equalized. This requires a larger technologi-

\textsuperscript{26}For brevity we only report the results of increasing $a$ in India to the level of the U.S. The results for a decline of $a$ in the U.S. are available upon request.

\textsuperscript{27}Taking the U.S. as the frontier economy is purely for simplicity. Suppose there is an exogenous technological frontier $Q_{F,t}$, which grows at rate $g$. Suppose that the step size in country $c$ is given by (30) relative to this frontier, i.e. $\gamma_{c,t} = \gamma \times (Q_{F,t}/Q_{c,t})^{\lambda}$. If the U.S. economy has already reached its BGP, (30) holds with $\gamma_{US} = g/\tau_{US}$.
cal gap. Differences in $\alpha$, by affecting the rate of creative destruction, therefore manifest themselves in level differences, not in growth differences in the long run. During the transition, an increase in $\alpha$ increases the growth rate of $Q_{IND}$. In addition, a change in $\alpha$ has static consequences as it increases the amount of managerial efficiency units, $M_t$, and hence raises income per capita, holding the level of $Q_t$ fixed (see (6)).

To quantify the strength of these forces, we consider an experiment where in 2010 $\alpha$ in India increases unexpectedly and permanently from $\alpha_{IND}$ to $\alpha_{US}$. We then trace out the dynamic evolution of the Indian economy. To do so we need to calibrate $\gamma_{US}$, $\lambda$ and the initial productivity differences between the U.S. and India. We assume that the U.S. economy is on a BGP and choose $\gamma_{US}$ to match a growth rate of 2%, given the rate of creative destruction reported in Table 5. India, in contrast, is still catching up to the U.S. economy. Empirically, relative TFP in the U.S. vis-à-vis India decreased substantially from about 4 in 1985 to 3.2 in 2005 (see Section B.2 in the Appendix, in particular Figure 9). We therefore calibrate $\lambda$ and the relative productivity between the U.S. and India in 1985, $Q_{IND,1985}/Q_{US,1985}$, to match these time-series dynamics. This exercise implies that $\lambda = 0.296$.

In Table 8, we summarize the aggregate implications of this experiment. In Panel A, we report the implications for the growth rate of the technology index $Q_t$. On impact, the growth rate increases by about 0.16 percentage points in 2010. Over time, this growth rate differential between the baseline and the counterfactual Indian economy declines, and in the long run, relative technology (and income) growth is equal in both countries. In Panel B we calculate the cumulative effect of this higher growth rate on the (relative) level of $Q_t$. In 2000, the technology in India is about 26.5% of the U.S. level. Our baseline estimates imply that long-run technological differences between the U.S. and India would be about 49%. If the productivity of managers in India were equal to the U.S. level, relative technology in India would be equal to 52%. Hence, differences in the productivity of outside managers reduce relative technology in India by 5% and can account for $50.4 - 46.9 = 5.5\%$ of the long-run technological gap between the U.S. and India.

The effects on income per capita differences, shown in Panel C, are larger. In the long run, an increase in the efficiency of delegating managerial tasks is predicted to raise relative income per capita in India from 51.5% to around 57.2%, i.e. by about 11%. This accounts for $57.2 - 51.5 = 12\%$ of the aggregate gap in income per capita. The effects are larger because of the static effects captured by $M$. In particular, the magnitudes of the static effects of better delegation and the dynamic effects operating though higher creative destruction are roughly equal. Additionally, the increase in $\alpha$ also reduces the number of production workers as individuals sort into managerial occupations. Quantitatively, the number of production workers declines by about 2.4% along the BGP.

While we use plant level data from the manufacturing sector for the firm-related moments, here we rely on data about aggregate TFP. As long as relative TFP in the manufacturing sector, $TFP_{Ind}/TFP_{US}$ shows the same rate of catch-up, our analysis will be valid. If aggregate TFP in India were to show faster catch-up (e.g., due to the reallocation of workers out of agriculture), our estimate of $\lambda$ would be upward biased and we would underestimate the aggregate consequences of changes in $\alpha$ - see equation (31). Additionally, the increase in $\alpha$ also reduces the number of production workers as individuals sort into managerial occupations. Quantitatively, the number of production workers declines by about 2.4% along the BGP.
Table 8: Increasing the Productivity of Outside Managers in India: Macroeconomic Implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year:</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>∞</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panel A: Productivity Growth $g_Q$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
<td>2.72%</td>
<td>2.61%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = \alpha_{US}$</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>3.01%</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
<td>2.71%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel B: Relative productivity $Q_{IND}/Q_{US}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = \alpha_{US}$</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel C: Relative income per capita $y_{IND}/y_{US}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = \alpha_{US}$</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel D: Relative Consumption $c_{IND}/c_{US}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha = \alpha_{US}$</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table reports the aggregate implications of an increase in the productivity of outside managers in India from $\alpha_{IND}$ to $\alpha_{US}$ in the year 2010. We report the rate of growth of the productivity index $Q_t$ (Panel A), the differences in $Q_t$ between the U.S. and India (Panel B), the differences in income per capita (Panel C), and the differences in consumption per capita (Panel D). This results are based on an estimate for $\lambda$ of 0.294 (see Section B.2 in the Appendix).

7 Robustness

In this section, we discuss the robustness of our results. For each specification, we recalibrate both the U.S. and the Indian economy and redo our analysis. Overall, we find that our main conclusions are fairly robust across these different specifications. All results are reported in Table 9. In the table, we report the implied levels of creative destruction in both countries (columns 1 and 2) as a summary statistic of the respective calibrations and the changes in creative destruction, relative technology and income, average firm size, and the share of small firms among 21 to 25 year-old firms in India due to an increase in $\alpha$ to the U.S. level. We discuss the different specifications contained in the different panels in turn. In Panel A of Table 9 we report our baseline results for comparison.

To summarize: our baseline calibration is qualitatively robust across the different alternatives we consider. The most important parameters for the aggregate impact of changes in the productivity of outside managers are the "management elasticity" $\sigma$, the elasticity of labor supply and the dispersion of managerial human capital $\theta$. If anything, we find that the aggregate results of our baseline calibration are likely to be conservative.

Alternative estimates of $\sigma$: Our baseline estimates of $\sigma$ are identified from the estimated treatment effect of the managerial intervention of Bloom et al. (2013). A concern with this strategy is that we had to restrict $\sigma$ to be constant across countries. In Panels B and C we report the results from an alternative strategy that addresses these limitations. In Panel B we consider a calibration, which does not rely on the experimental results of Bloom et al. (2013) but instead uses the share of managerial
Table 9: Robustness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\tau_{IND}$</th>
<th>$\tau_{US}$</th>
<th>Change in ... due to the increase from $\alpha_{IND}$ to $\alpha_{US}$</th>
<th>$\tau_{IND}$</th>
<th>$Q_{IND}/Q_{US}$</th>
<th>$y_{IND}/y_{US}$</th>
<th>Avg. Share of firm size small firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>4.37%</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>4.71%</td>
<td>6.38% 14.25% 1.16% -1.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>5.72%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.15% 15.37% 3.37% -1.62%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\zeta_e^L = 0.4$</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>4.39%</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>4.44%</td>
<td>5.48% 11.60% 2.10% -1.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\zeta_e^H = 0.6$</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>4.89%</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>4.39%</td>
<td>5.28% 10.54% 4.97% -2.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta L/L = 2%$</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>5.09%</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>8.19%</td>
<td>9.87% 22.05% 4.00% -2.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta L/L = 5%$</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>8.19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.51%</td>
<td>6.25% -0.73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Panel A contains our baseline results based on the parameters reported in Table 3. In Panels B and C we estimate $\sigma$ based on accounting information and allow it to differ across countries. In Panel D we consider two different values for the elasticity of the entry technology, $\zeta_e^L = 0.4$ and $\zeta_e^H = 0.6$. In Panel E we consider two different values for the convexity of the innovation function, $\zeta^L = 0.4$ and $\zeta^H = 0.6$. In Panel F we report the results when we calibrate the model for the U.S. economy to firm-level moments. In Panel G, we consider two values for $\lambda$, which controls the strength of the knowledge diffusion in step size for India, $\lambda^L = 0.217$ and $\lambda^H = 0.424$. These values are chosen such that the speed of convergence (in terms of half-life) is 25% longer ($\lambda^L$) and 25% shorter ($\lambda^H$) compared to the baseline Indian economy. In Panel H we allow the total workforce to increase by 2% or 5% in response to the change in $\alpha$. In Panel I we consider a value for $\theta$ of 2.4.

30Because we observe this moment in both countries, this strategy allows us to let $\sigma$ vary across countries. Our calibrated model is able to match this moment precisely in both countries. We estimate that $\sigma_{IND} = 0.64$ and $\sigma_{US} = 0.63$. While these are higher than our baseline estimate of $\sigma = 0.46$, it is reassuring to see that they are consistent with the observed moments.

30In Section B.1 in the Appendix we discuss in detail how we measure this moment.
very similar in the U.S. and India. In Panel C, we use both the estimated treatment effect and the managerial compensation shares as moments and we find that $\sigma_{\text{IND}} = 0.45$ and $\sigma_{\text{US}} = 0.63$. These estimates for $\sigma$ would amplify the aggregate consequences of an increase in $\alpha$ as managerial services are a more important factor in production.

**Entry:** In our benchmark specification, we assume that entrants have access to the same innovation technology as incumbent firms, i.e. the cost function has an elasticity governed by $\zeta_e = \zeta = 0.5$. To assess the importance of this parameter, we recalibrate our model, both for the U.S. and India, while setting $\zeta_e$ to alternative values. The higher the value of $\zeta_e$, the more responsive are entrants to changes in the value of entry. As shown in Panel D, if we set $\zeta_e$ to 0.4 (0.6), the effects of improving the efficiency of outside managers are smaller (larger). In terms of income per capita, our baseline results decrease (increase) by 0.5 percentage point. As expected, a higher entry elasticity reduces the effect on average firm size.

**Convexity of incumbents’ expansion technology:** As in our robustness exercise concerning entrants, we also study how the convexity of the expansion cost function for incumbent firms changes our results. Interestingly, the results are exactly the opposite of the ones found in Panel E: the higher (lower) the elasticity of incumbent innovation, the stronger (weaker) the response of aggregate income and creative destruction to changes in $\alpha$. The reason is that, in India, entrants account for most creative destruction. The higher the incumbent expansion elasticity, the more entrants are crowded out. While this increases average firm size, it actually reduces the aggregate impact of changes in $\alpha$.

**Firm-Level Analysis:** For our baseline analysis, we have focused solely on establishment-level data. We did so to ensure comparability between the U.S. and India since we cannot link individual establishments to specific firms in the Indian data. Panel F shows that this choice has no substantial implications for our conclusions - the counterfactual implications of an increase in $\alpha$ are quantitatively similar when we calibrate the U.S. parameters to firm-level moments. This distinction is less important in India, as the vast majority of firms in India own only a single establishment.\(^{31}\)

**Strength of Knowledge Diffusion:** Our benchmark analysis estimates the diffusion parameter $\lambda$ from the time series of TFP differences between India and the U.S.. Our estimate implies a half-life of around 50 years. We considered two alternative values for $\lambda$ which increase (reduce) the speed of convergence by 25%. Recall that this parameter only affects aggregate income differences and not the firm size distribution. Panel G of Table 9 shows that a faster transition speed (i.e. a high level of $\lambda$) decreases the impact of $\alpha$ on productivity and income differences. This follows directly from (31), which shows that $Q_{\text{IND}}/Q_{\text{US}}$ is less sensitive to changes in $\tau$ if $\lambda$ is large. The quantitative results are, however, in the ballpark of our baseline estimates.

**Elastic Labor Supply:** In our main analysis we considered the total labor supply as exogenous and hence non-responsive to an increase in $\alpha$. If an increase in the productivity of outside managers in the manufacturing sector raises productivity, we might expect the manufacturing sector to draw in

\(^{31}\)The model is able to match the firm-level moments quite well. The main difference between establishments and firms at the horizon of age 21-25 is the life-cycle, the aggregate employment share, and the relative exit rate. The life-cycle is slightly steeper, the employment share is lower (because very old firms are much bigger than very old establishments), and the relative exit rate of young firms is higher than that of older establishments, because old firms exit less frequently than older establishments. Moreover, the aggregate entry rate is slightly lower at the firm level. In Section OA-2.1 in the Online Appendix, we provide more details on establishment-firm comparison for the U.S.
workers from the rest of the economy. In Panel H we report the results when we assume that the total workforce in the manufacturing sector increases by 2% or 5% when $\alpha$ is increased to the U.S. level. This amplifies our results because an increase in the workforce increases creative destruction and hence reduces income differences. The reason is that in our model, innovation and entry respond positively to the size of the workforce, which increases firm profits.

**Dispersion in managerial human capital $\vartheta$:** For our baseline estimates, we use the dispersion in log managerial earnings to calibrate the dispersion in managerial human capital $\vartheta$. As already discussed in Section 4.1 above, our assumption regarding the managerial skill distribution implies that average managerial earnings relative to those of production workers are given by $\vartheta/(\vartheta - 1)$. The managerial earnings premium of 0.54 log points in the U.S. implies a higher $\vartheta$ value of 2.4. Panel I shows the results based on this higher value. This parameter is quite important in that the change in relative income per capita due to the increase in $\alpha$ declines from 11% to 4.5%. The main reason is that a higher $\vartheta$ makes the labor supply of managers more elastic. This implies that a given change in $\alpha$ induces a sharper decline in the number workers. This in turn tends to lower profits and hence weakens the effect on expansion, entry and creative destruction.

### 8 Conclusion

We asked whether inefficiencies delegating managerial tasks to outside managers are an important determinant of the process of firm dynamics and aggregate income in poor countries. To answer this question, we proposed a novel model of firm growth that highlights the interaction between managerial delegation, firms’ incentives to expand, and the aggregate process of reallocation and growth. Our theory predicts an inherent complementarity between the productivity of outside managers and firm size, as delegation only becomes necessary once firms reach a certain scale. If firms anticipate that they will not be able delegate efficiently once they grow large, their incentives to expand are throttled. At the micro-level, this implies that most firms stay small. At the macro-level, this reduces the extent of reallocation, allows stagnant, subsistence producers to survive, and lowers aggregate productivity.

To quantify the strength of this mechanism, we calibrate our model to plant-level data from India and the U.S. To credibly identify the link between managerial inputs and firms’ incentives to expand, we estimate our structural model to the experimental evidence on the relationship between management practices and firm performance reported in Bloom et al. (2013).

We draw three lessons from our quantitative analysis. First, we find that the Indian economy suffers from a lack of selection, which allows subsistence firms to survive. The glut of small firms in poor countries may therefore not be simply a result of frictions these firms face, but rather a sign that other, more dynamic firms do not grow sufficiently. Policies targeted at small firms could therefore end up supporting stagnant producers and have unintended consequences.

Second, we find that differences in the productivity of outside managers have non-trivial macroeconomic implications. Our estimates imply that a given manager is only half as productive in India as in the U.S. If Indian firms could use managers as efficiently as U.S. firms, income per capita in the long-run would increase by 11%. This increase is due to both static and dynamic effects which
are of roughly equal size.

Finally, we find a strong complementarity between the productivity of outside managers and other factors affecting firm growth. While an increase to U.S. standards would raise average firm size in India only modestly, firms in the U.S. would shrink substantially if they had to operate with management practices common in India. Hence, for improvements in the productivity of outside managers to have sizable effects in India, other determinants of firm growth also need to be addressed: even if one of its tires is fixed, a car cannot run when the rest of its tires remain broken.

References


Appendices

A Theoretical Appendix

A.1 Firm Size Distribution

Let \( v_{n,t}^H \) denote the share of high-type firms with \( n \) products, and \( F_j^t \) be the number of firms of type \( j \). Then, firm size distribution of the economy can be represented by the following differential equations:

\[
\frac{\partial F_j^H v_{n,t}^H}{\partial t} = z_t \delta - F_j^H v_{n,t}^H \tau_{H,j}^t \quad (32)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial F_j^H v_{n,t}^H}{\partial t} = \left[ v_{n-1,t}^H (n-1) x_{n-1,t}^H + v_{n+1,t}^H \tau_{H,t}^j (n+1) - v_{n,t}^H (\tau_{H,t}^j + x_{n,t}) \right] \times F_j^H. \quad (33)
\]

\[
\frac{\partial F_j^L}{\partial t} = z_t (1 - \delta) - F_j^L \tau_{L,j}. \quad (34)
\]

and the requirement that \( v_{n,t}^H \) be a proper distribution, \( \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} v_{n,t}^H = 1 \).

Equation (32) states that the number of one-product high type firms is given by difference between entering high-type firms and exiting high-type firms. Recall that \( \tau_{j,t} \) denotes the rate at which a firm of type \( j \) loses a given product at each point in time. Similarly, equation (33) is an accounting equation for the net-change in the number of high type firms with \( n \) products. Finally, (34) is the analogue of (32) for low-type firms, which always have a single product.

**Proposition 1** Consider a stationary equilibrium and let the flow of entry \( z \) and high-type firms’ expansion rates \( \{x_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty} \) at stationary equilibrium be given. The distribution of high-type firms is

\[
v_n^H = \frac{n^{-1} \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \tau_{H,s} \prod_{j=1}^{s} \left( \frac{x_j}{\tau_{H,j}} \right)}{\sum_{s=1}^{\infty} s^{-1} \sum_{j=1}^{s} \left( \frac{x_j}{\tau_{H,j}} \right)}, \quad (35)
\]

the measure of high- and low-type firms is

\[
F^H = \frac{\delta z}{\tau_H} \times \left[ \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{\tau_{H,n} \prod_{j=1}^{n} \left( \frac{x_j}{\tau_{H,j}} \right)}{n x_n} \right] \quad \text{and} \quad F^L = \frac{(1 - \delta) z}{\tau_L}, \quad (36)
\]

the aggregate rate of creative destruction is

\[
\tau = z \times \left[ \delta \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} \prod_{j=1}^{s} \left( \frac{x_j}{\tau_{H,j}} \right) + 1 \right], \quad (37)
\]

and the type-specific creative destruction rates are

\[
\tau_H = \tau - z (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{\beta - 1}{\beta} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \tau_L = \beta \tau - z (1 - \delta) (\beta - 1). \quad (38)
\]

**Proof.** By setting the time derivatives to zero in (32), (33) and (34), stationary firm size distribution
is described by the following equations

\[
F^H v^H_1 \tau_H = z \times \delta \tag{39}
\]

\[
v^H_n (\tau_H + x_n) = v^H_{n-1} (n - 1) x_{n-1} + v^H_{n+1} \tau_H (n + 1) \tag{40}
\]

\[
F^L \tau_L = z \times (1 - \delta) \tag{41}
\]

Let \( v^H_1 \) and \( \tau \) be given. First note that consistency requires that the total amount of innovation has to be equal to the total rate of creative destruction:

\[
\tau = \tau_H (1 - F^L) + \tau_L F^L \tag{42}
\]

Then, by using (41), (42) and \( \tau_L = \beta \tau_H \), we get

\[
\tau_H = \tau - z (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{\beta - 1}{\beta} \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \tau_L = \beta \tau - z (1 - \delta) (\beta - 1). \tag{43}
\]

Next, by using (39) - (41), we calculate \( F^L, F^H \), and \( \{v^H_n\}^\infty_{n=2} \).

**Lemma 1** The distribution of high types takes the following form

\[
v^H_n = \frac{\prod_{j=1}^n x_j}{\tau_H^n} x_n v^H_1. \tag{44}
\]

**Proof.** Substituting (44) in (39) - (41) shows that if \( v^H_n \) satisfies (44), it satisfies all the flow equations in (39) - (41). □

This implies that \( 1 = \sum_{n=1}^\infty v^H_n = v^H_1 \sum_{n=1}^\infty \frac{1}{n} \frac{\tau_H}{x_n} \prod_{j=1}^n \left( \frac{x_j}{\tau_H} \right) \), so that (44) reads

\[
v^H_n = \frac{1}{n} \frac{\prod_{j=1}^n x_j}{\tau_H^n} x_n \sum_{s=1}^\infty \frac{1}{s} \frac{\tau_H}{x_s} \prod_{j=1}^s \left( \frac{x_j}{\tau_H} \right). \tag{45}
\]

Then, from (39) and (41), we have

\[
F^H = \frac{\delta z}{\tau_H} \times \left[ \sum_{n=1}^\infty \frac{1}{n} \frac{\tau_H}{x_n} \prod_{j=1}^n \left( \frac{x_j}{\tau_H} \right) \right] \quad \text{and} \quad F^L = \frac{(1 - \delta) z}{\tau_L}.
\]

Hence, we only need to determine \( \tau \), which we get from (19) as

\[
\tau = \sum_{n=1}^\infty n x_n v^H_n F^H + z = \left[ \sum_{n=1}^\infty \delta \left( \prod_{j=1}^n \left( \frac{x_j}{\tau_H} \right) \right) + 1 \right] z. \tag{46}
\]

Together with (43), one can show that (46) has a unique solution for \( \tau \). □

**A.2 Derivation of Equation (21)**

We can express \( \ln Q_t \) after an instant \( \Delta t \) as

\[
\ln Q_{t+\Delta t} = \int_0^1 \left[ \tau_i \Delta t \ln (\gamma_t q_{ij}) + (1 - \tau_t \Delta t) \ln q_{ij} \right] \, dj
\]

\[
= \tau_t \Delta t \ln (\gamma_t) + \ln Q_t
\]
where second and higher order terms in $\Delta t$ are omitted. By subtracting $\ln Q_t$ from both sides, dividing by $\Delta t$, and taking the limit as $\Delta t \to 0$, we get

$$g_t = \frac{\dot{Q}_t}{Q_t} = \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \frac{\ln Q_{t+\Delta t} - \ln Q_t}{\Delta t} = \ln (\gamma_t) \tau_t.$$  

### A.3 Transient Dynamics with Stationary Firm Size Distribution

**Proposition 2** Suppose that the firm-size distribution at time $t$ coincides with the stationary distribution characterized in Proposition 1. Then, for any path of the step size $\gamma_t$, there is an equilibrium path, where (i) the firm size distribution remains stationary, (ii) all aggregate variables grow at the same rate $\ln (\gamma_t) \tau_{BGP}$, where $\tau_{BGP}$ is the constant rate of creative destruction rate at the stationary equilibrium.

**Proof.** Note that in the stationary equilibrium of the model described in Online Appendix OA-1.3, the step size $\gamma_t$ does not affect any expressions. Hence, we need to show that there exists an interest rate path $r_t$ such that $C_t$, $Q_t$, and $Y_t$ grow at the same rate during the transition. If this was the case, firms’ innovation and entry choices would not change and the distribution would remain stationary. It is easy to see that interest rate path

$$r_t = \ln (\gamma_t) \tau_{BGP} + \rho$$

serves the purpose. Recall that consumption decisions of the household yield the usual Euler equation which implies that

$$r_t = g_{C,t} + \rho$$

so that under the proposed interest rate path, $g_{C,t} = \ln (\gamma_t) \tau_{BGP}$. Moreover $g_{Q,t} = \ln (\gamma_t) \tau_{BGP}$ as shown in Appendix A.2. Lastly we have $Y_t = Q_t M_t L_{P,t}$. Since $M_t$ and $L_{P,t}$ are constant at the proposed equilibrium, this implies that $g_{Y,t} = g_{Q,t}$. Therefore all growing variables grow at the same rate.

### B Empirical Appendix

#### B.1 Data

In this section we provide more information about our data sources.

**Establishment- and Firm-level Information for the U.S.** We use data from the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS). BDS is a product of the U.S. Census Bureau. The BDS data are compiled from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). The LBD is a longitudinal database of business establishments and firms covering the years between 1976 and 2012. We focus on the manufacturing sector in 2012. The data are publicly available at [http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/](http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/).

For our analysis, we utilize the following four moments from the U.S. data: (i) the cross-sectional relationship between age and size, which we refer to as the life-cycle, (ii) the aggregate employment share by age, (iii) the exit rate as a function of age conditional on size, and (iv) the rate of entry. For our main analysis we focus on establishments. The BDS reports both aggregate employment and the number of establishments by age. This allows us to calculate the first two moments. The BDS also directly reports both entry and exit rates for each size-age bin. The entry rate at the establishment level is calculated as the number of new establishments at time $t$ relative to the average number of establishments in $t$ and $t-1$. Similarly, the exit rate at the establishment level is calculated as the number of exiting establishments in $t$ relative to the average number of establishments in $t$ and $t-1$. The corresponding information is also reported at the firm level. In particular, the BDS reports the number of exiting firms for different size-age bin. Note that all establishments owned by the firm
must exit for the firm to be considered an exiting firm. As for firm entry, we treat firms of age 0 as an entering firm. Because a firm’s age is derived from the age of its establishments, this implies that we treat firms as entering firms only if all their establishments are new. In Section OA-2.1 in the Online Appendix we provide detailed descriptive statistics about the dynamic process at both the firm- and establishment-level.

Establishment-Level Information for India As explained in the main body of the text, we construct a representative sample of the Indian manufacturing sector by combining data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and the National Sample Survey (NSS), which - every five years - has a special module to measure unorganized manufacturing establishments. We use cross-sectional data from 2010. In contrast to the U.S., both the ASI and NSS are based on establishments and we cannot link establishments to firms. With the majority of employment being accounted for by very small producers, multi-establishment firms are unlikely to be important for the aggregate in India. Firms in the NSS account for 99.2% of all establishments and for 76% of manufacturing employment. In Section OA-2.2 in the Online Appendix we provide more detailed descriptive statistics and additional results concerning the process of firm dynamics of ASI and NSS establishments.

Data on Managerial Compensation and Profits for the U.S. We identify \( \sigma \) from the share of managerial compensation in aggregate profits before managerial payments [see equation (47)]. To estimate this moment, we use two data sources. From NIPA we can retrieve a measure of aggregate profits in the manufacturing industry. Specifically, we start with aggregate corporate profits, which are directly measured in NIPA. The BEA’s featured measure of corporate profits - profits from current production - provides a comprehensive and consistent economic measure of the income earned by all U.S. corporations. As such, it is unaffected by changes in tax laws, and it is adjusted for non- and misreported income. We then add to this measure non-farm proprietors’ income in the manufacturing sector, which provides a comprehensive and consistent economic measure of the income earned by all U.S. unincorporated non-farm businesses.

To measure managerial wages, we augment the information in NIPA from information in the census. While NIPA reports compensation for workers, managerial payments are not directly recorded in NIPA. To calculate the managerial wage bill, we therefore use the U.S. census data. In the census we have micro data on labor compensation and occupations at the micro level. Hence, we calculate the share of managerial payments in the total wage bill and apply that share to the aggregate compensation data in NIPA. According to the census, managerial compensation amounts to roughly 20% of total wages. Recall that the managerial employment share in the U.S. is about 12% so that managerial wages are relatively high. We then calculate the share of managerial compensation (CSM) in aggregate profits net of managerial wages as

\[
CSM = \frac{\text{Managerial Compensation}}{\text{Corporate Profits} + \text{Nonfarm Proprietor’s Income} + \text{Managerial Compensation}},
\]

where "Managerial Compensation" is simply 20% of the total labor compensation in NIPA. We also calculate a second measure of CSM, where we do not include "Nonfarm Proprietor’s Income." We calculate CSM before the Great Recession, because we were concerned about corporate profits being very low during the financial crisis. CSM is quite volatile. It ranges from 65% in 2001 to 33% in 2006. For our calibration we focus on the average across the years 2000 - 2007, which is 51%. If we do not include "Nonfarm Proprietor’s Income", the numbers are very similar and only slightly larger, ranging from 69% in 2001 to 35% in 2006. Hence, it is not essential for us to take "Nonfarm Proprietor’s Income" into account.
Data on Managerial Employment and Earning: To measure managerial employment and earnings in the U.S. and India, we employ national Census data from the IPUMS project. We focus on the most recent year, which is 2010 for the U.S. and 2004 for India. For each country we get a sample from the census, which has detailed information about personnel characteristics. In particular we observe each respondent’s education, occupation, employment status, sex, and industry of employment. We focus on male workers in the manufacturing industry working in private-sector jobs.

The list of occupations according to ISCO is contained in Table 10. To qualify as a manager in the sense of our theory, two characteristics have to be satisfied. First, the respective individual has to work as a “Legislator, senior official, and manager.” In order to focus on managers, which are agents of a firm owner, i.e., outside managers, we also require workers to be wage workers and not working on their own account or to be unpaid family members. This information is also contained in the IPUMS census data in the variable “worker type.” As we showed in Table 1 above, it is important to take these differences into account as poor countries have a higher share of people working on their own account (or as a family member) conditional on being classified as a manager according to ISCO.

| Legislators, senior officials, and managers | Plant and machine operators and assemblers |
| Professionals | Elementary occupations |
| Technicians and associate professionals | Armed forces |
| Clerks | Other occupations, unspecified or n.e.c. |
| Service workers and shop and market sales | Response suppressed |
| Skilled agricultural and fishery workers | Unknown |
| Crafts and related trades workers | NIU (not in universe) |

Notes: Table 10 contains the occupational categories available in the IPUMS data. A necessary condition for someone to be classified as an outside manager is to be assigned the occupational title “Legislator, senior officials, and managers.” See the main body of the text for the additional requirements.

B.2 Identification of the Model

We will now discuss the identification of our model in more detail. In total, there are 11 parameters to identify:

\[ \Omega \equiv \{a, \sigma, T, \mu_M, \theta, \theta_E, \delta, \beta, \gamma, \tau^{US}, \lambda \} \]

In Section A.1, we discussed how the distribution of firm size is determined given the optimal innovation and entry rates \( \{x_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty} \) and \( z \). More specifically, \( \{x_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty} \) and \( z \) determine the aggregate innovation rate \( \tau \) and these three objects together uniquely pin down the joint distribution of age and size, i.e., the entire process of firm-dynamics. The four parameters that affect this process directly are \( (\theta, \theta_E, \beta, \delta) \). We therefore use the following four firm-level moments to calibrate these parameters: (i) the life cycle, i.e., the relative size of firms of age 21-25 to firms of age 1-5, (ii) the share of aggregate employment accounted for by firms of age 21-25, (iii) the relative exit rate of 1-5 year old firms relative firms of age 21-25 conditional on size, and (iv) the entry rate. Intuitively, the slope of the life-cycle is informative about \( \theta \), which determines the level of incumbent’s innovation effort. As \( \beta \) effectively controls the size of old cohorts (by determining the speed with which high-type firms exit), it is related to the aggregate importance of old cohorts in the economy, i.e., the relative employment share of old firms. The exit hazard conditional on size is informative about the degree of selection. If there was no type heterogeneity, the exit rate would only be a function of

\[ \text{Recall that we calibrate } \zeta \text{ and } \rho \text{ outside of the model.} \]
size. To the extent that older firms are positively selected, they are less likely to exit conditional on size. The ex-ante heterogeneity δ determines how strong this effect can be. Finally, the entry rate is informative about θE.

We then use several moments related to managerial employment patterns - namely the compensation of managers relative to corporate profits, the entrepreneurial share in total compensation, the dispersion of managerial wages, and managerial employment shares - to identify σ, T, θ, α and μM. Consider first σ, the elasticity of profits with respect to managerial services.\textsuperscript{33} In the model, the total compensation for managerial personnel relative to aggregate profits (before managerial payments) is given by

\[
\frac{w_{M}H_{M}}{\Pi + w_{M}H_{M}} = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} w_{M} \times n \times m(n) \times \varphi_{n}}{\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} e(n)^\sigma Y \times n \times \varphi_{n}},
\]

where \(\varphi_{n} = F^{H} v_{n}^{H}\) and \(\varphi_{1} = F^{H} v_{1}^{H} + F^{L}\) is the endogenous firm size distribution. By using \(m(n) = T \alpha^{-1} \times \max \{0, (n^*)^{-1} - (n)^{-1}\}\), \(w_{M} \equiv \frac{w_{M}}{\bar{Y}} = \sigma \alpha \left(\frac{n}{T}\right)^{1-\sigma}\) and \(e(n) = T \max \{n^{-1}, (n^*)^{-1}\}\), we get that

\[
\frac{w_{M}H_{M}}{\Pi + w_{M}H_{M}} = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} (n^*)^{1-\sigma} \left(\max \left\{0, \frac{1}{T} - \frac{1}{n}\right\}\right) \times n \times \varphi_{n}}{\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \left(\max \left\{\frac{1}{T}, \frac{1}{n}\right\}\right)^\sigma \times n \times \varphi_{n}}.
\]

(47)

Hence, conditional on \(n^*\) and the firm size distribution, (47) only depends on \(\sigma\).

To determine T, we target the share of income accruing to entrepreneurs after paying for their factors of production. As entrepreneurs are the residual claimants on firm profits, this moment is simply given by

\[
\frac{\Pi}{\bar{Y}} = \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} [e(n)^\sigma - \omega_{M} m(n)] \times n \times \varphi_{n}
\]

\[
= T^\sigma \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \left[ \max \left\{n^{-1}, (n^*)^{-1}\right\} \right]^\sigma \times n \times \varphi_{n},
\]

which is directly informative about \(T\) for given \(n^*, \varphi_{n}\), and \(\sigma\).

The shape parameter of skill distribution \(\theta\) can be identified directly from the dispersion of managerial earnings. To see this, note that the earnings of a manager with relative skill \(h\) is \(w_{M}h\). The distribution of managerial earning is therefore given by

\[
P \left[ w_{M}h > x \mid h \geq \frac{w_{p}}{w_{M}} \right] = \left( \frac{w_{p}}{w_{M}} \right)^{\theta} = \left( \frac{w_{p}}{x} \right)^{\theta},
\]

which is pareto with shape \(\theta\) and location \(w_{p}\). Defining the relative managerial earnings \(y \equiv \ln \left( \frac{w_{M}h}{w_{p}} \right)\), we get \(P \left( y \leq y_{0} \right) = 1 - e^{-\theta y_{0}}\), so that

\[
\text{var} \left( y \right) = \text{var} \left( \ln \left( \frac{w_{M}h}{w_{p}} \right) \right) = \text{var} \left( \ln \left( w_{M}h \right) \right) = \theta^{-2}.
\]

Hence, we can calibrate \(\theta\) directly to the variance of log managerial earnings.

Finally, we identify \(\alpha\) and \(\mu_{M}\) by using the share of managers in the whole economy \(\text{and} among Indian immigrants to the U.S. economy. Let \(\chi\) denote the equilibrium managerial employment share.

\textsuperscript{33} Although the specific ordering of parameters in the identification discussion is not essential, it facilitates the argument.
which is given by

$$\chi = P \left[ h_M w_M \geq w_p \right] = \left( \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \mu_M \frac{\sigma \alpha}{\omega_p} \left( n^* T \right)^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\theta}.$$ 

Using the expression for total managerial demand, the equilibrium condition for the managerial labor market can be written as

$$\mu_M \alpha = \left( \chi \right)^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \times \sum_{n \geq n^*} \left( \frac{1}{n^*} - \frac{1}{n} \right) \times n \times \varphi_n. \quad (48)$$

Hence, given $n^*$, $T$, $\theta$, and $\varphi_n$, we can directly determine $\mu_M \times \alpha$ from the data on the share of managers in the whole population (i.e., $\chi$). To separate the effect of managerial human capital ($\mu_M$) from delegation efficiency ($\alpha$), we use data on managerial employment pattern of Indian immigrants. Because our approach uses additional data and because all allocations in the model only depend on $\mu_M \times \alpha$, we discuss the details of our strategy in Section B.4. Once we identify $\mu_M$, we get $\alpha$ from (48).

Lastly we use moments regarding aggregate dynamics of the economies to pin down $\gamma$ and $\lambda$. In particular, we calibrate the step-size for U.S., $\gamma^{US}$, to fit the aggregate growth rate as $g = \ln \left( \gamma^{US} \right) \tau$ and U.S. is assumed to be on the balanced growth path. In the case of India, step size is partly determined by the productivity gap between U.S. and India and $\lambda$ parametrizes the importance of this channel on step size [see (30)]. By using (21) and (30), we can write productivity differences $Z_t \equiv \frac{Q_{US,t}}{Q_{IND,t}}$ as

$$Z_t = Z_t \left\{ \ln(\gamma^{US} t_{US,t} - t_{IND,t}) \left[ \ln(\gamma^{US}) + \lambda \ln(Z_t) \right] \right\}.$$ 

Therefore, given $\gamma^{US}$, the aggregate rates creative destruction for U.S. and India and an initial condition $Z_{t0}$, the dynamics of productivity differences are informative about $\alpha$. To relate $Z_t$ to the data, note that empirically we observe total factor productivity as implied by the Penn World Tables. Our model implies that TFP is given by $\text{TFP} = Q M$ (see (6)). Hence, relative TFP is given by $\text{TFP}_{US} / \text{TFP}_{IND} = Z_t M_{US} / M_{IND}$. Note that if the firm-size distribution is stationary, $M_t$ is constant. In Figure 9 we depict the evolution of relative TFP levels between the U.S. and India between 1985 and 2005. It is clearly seen that India is catching up as relative TFP differences decline from 4 in 1985 to roughly 3.5 in 2005. We therefore calibrate $\lambda$ and level of relative productivity in 1985, $Z_{1985}$, to minimize the distance (as measured by the sum of squared residuals) between the model and the data. The resulting fit is also displayed in Figure 9.

**B.3 Identifying the managerial output elasticity $\sigma$**

In this section we describe in detail how we estimate the anagerial output elasticity $\sigma$ using indirect inference. As explained in Section 3.2, our measure of firms’ managerial environment is their total managerial services $e = T/n + \alpha \times m$ (see (7)). This object is endogenous through firms’ choice of outside managers $m$. While $e$ is not directly observable, we assume that it is related to the observable share of managerial practices firms adopt. We refer to the share of practices firm $f$ adopts as $MP_f$. In particular, we assume that $e$ and $MP_f$ are related via the measurement equation $e_f = v MP_f^\alpha$. As explained in Section 3.2, we can use the pre-treatment information on the share of adopted practices in the U.S. and India and the model-implied differences in $e$ in our U.S. and India calibration to identify $\rho$. Given $\rho$, we can then express the model-implied change in total managerial efficiency among treatment plants by 23% (see footnote
Because \( e \) is endogenous, we have to take a stand how the experiment induced firms to increase \( e \) by 23\%, i.e. which structural parameter changed. We assume that the experiment increases the total efficiency of managerial services \( e \) by a multiple \( \xi > 1 \). Hence, if a treatment firm hires \( m \) units of managerial human capital on the market, it generates \( \xi e = \xi \left( T/n + \alpha \times m \right) \) units of managerial services in the firm. This formalization captures the main spirit of the experiment in that the intervention provided information about how to make management more efficient via the provision of consulting services, but left the actual adoption of such managerial practices up to the treatment firms.

In practice we implement this procedure in the following way. Given the partial equilibrium nature of the experiment, treatment firms chose their optimal quantity of efficiency units of outside managers according to (8) taking the higher return to managerial services \( \xi \) as given. Formally, the optimal number of outside managers treatment firms hire, \( m(\xi) \), is implicitly defined by

\[
\left[ m_j(\xi) \right]_{j=1}^{n} = \arg\max_{m_j \geq 0} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \left\{ \left( \xi \left( \frac{T}{n} + \alpha m_j \right) \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} Y - w_M m_j \right\}.
\]

The solution to this problem is given by (see (10))

\[
m(n; \xi) = \left( \frac{\sigma}{\omega_M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \left( \frac{\xi \alpha}{\omega_M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} - \frac{1}{\alpha} \frac{T}{n},
\]

and the associated number of managerial services, \( e(n; \xi) \) is given by

\[
e(n; \xi) = \xi \left( T/n + \alpha m(n; \xi) \right) = \left( \frac{\xi \alpha \sigma}{\omega_M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}.
\]

This implies that

\[
\frac{e_{\text{Treat}}^{\text{IND}}}{e_{\text{IND}}} = \frac{e(n; \xi)}{e(n)} = \left( \frac{\xi \alpha \sigma / \omega_M}{\alpha \sigma / \omega_M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} = \xi^{1/(1-\sigma)},
\]

so that the required productivity increase \( \overline{\xi} \) for treatment firms to increase their level of managerial efficiency from \( e_{\text{IND}} \) to \( e_{\text{Treat}}^{\text{IND}} \) is given by \( \overline{\xi} = \left( \frac{e_{\text{Treat}}^{\text{IND}}}{e_{\text{IND}}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \).
Given \( \xi \) we then perform the following steps:

1. We select 100 firms (50 for the treatment and 50 for the control group) from the top 0.01% of the size distribution from our India calibration. This selection procedure based on size mimics the selection procedure in Bloom et al. (2013), who note that the experimental firms had "about 270 employees, assets of 13 million, and sales of 7.5 million a year. Compared to U.S. manufacturing firms, these firms would be in the top 2% by employment and the top 4% by sales, and compared to India manufacturing they are in the top 1% by both employment and sales (Hsieh and Klenow 2010)” (Bloom et al., 2013, p. 9). Because we calibrate our model to the population of Indian firms (i.e. including firms in the NSS), firms with 270+ employees correspond to the top 0.01% of the firm size distribution. Our calibrated model implies that this set of firms coincides with firms of \( n = 7 \) products.

2. We then scale the total managerial efficiency of treatment firms by \( \xi \) to induce the required increase in managerial efficiency \( e \) and simulate their life-cycle for 100 weeks. Note that treatment firms are free to change their number of outside managers at any point at the equilibrium wage rate \( w_M \) of the baseline economy to mimic the partial equilibrium nature of the experiment. For the entire 100 weeks, managerial services in treatment firms have a productivity advantage of \( \xi \).

3. We then measure profits for all 100 weeks according to (8) for both treatment and control firms. For control firms, profits gross of innovation spending are given by (25). For treatment firms, profits are given by

\[
\tilde{\pi}(n; \xi) = (1 - \sigma) e(n; \xi) n + e(n; \xi)^{-\sigma} \sigma \xi T.
\]

Hence, treatment firms have higher profits for three reasons: (1) they hire more managerial service given their size \( m(n; \xi) > m(n) \), (2) they receive a direct benefit of being able to use \( e \) more efficiently \( (\xi > 1) \) and (3) they will on average be larger as their innovation incentives increase. While (1) and (2) are static effects, (3) is a dynamic effect.

4. Given the model-generated data on \( \tilde{\pi}(n; \xi) \) and \( \tilde{\pi}(n) \) we then run the regression in (26), i.e. we estimate the specification

\[
\ln \tilde{\pi}_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \times TREAT_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{53}
\]

and recover the treatment effect \( \hat{\beta}_1 \). Note that in our regression there is no need to use firm-fixed effects as all firms with \( n > 1 \) are high-type firms and all firms have the same size \( n \). As explained in Section 3.2 we choose profits as our measure of firm-performance, while Bloom et al. (2013) focus on physical output. Bloom et al. (2013) do not estimate a treatment effect based on profits.

5. To average out the sampling variation in our estimate, we replicate this procedure 250 times and calculate the model-implied treatment effect

\[
\hat{\beta}_{Treat} = \frac{1}{250} \sum_{i=1}^{250} \hat{\beta}_1^{(i)}.
\tag{54}
\]

Recall that in order to infer \( e_{Treat}^{IND} \), we had to assume a particular value for the share of practices adopted by firms in the U.S., \( MP_{US} \) (see (27)). For our baseline calibration, we assumed that firms in the U.S. adopt all such practices as these practices "have been standard for decades in the developed world” (Bloom et al., 2013, p. 43). From the experimental micro-data, we can provide
some additional evidence for this assumption. In the experimental data for Indian firms, we observe two objects related to the firms’ managerial environment: the share of particular practices the firm implements and the management score from Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). The management score is only measured pre-treatment but the practices are observed pre- and post-treatment. Using the pre-treatment variation of managerial practices and managerial scores across the Indian firms and the estimated changes in managerial practices due to the treatment, we can predict the average change in the firms’ managerial score induced by the intervention. More specifically, we first run the cross-sectional regression
\[ BVR_f = \beta + \gamma \times MP_f + \epsilon_f, \]
where \( BVR_f \) is the management score from Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and \( MP_f \) is the share of adopted managerial practices. We then predict the change in the BVR score due to the treatment according to
\[ E[BVR_f|Treatment] = E[BVR_f] + \hat{\gamma} \times (E[MP_f|Treatment] - E[MP_f]), \]
where \( \hat{\gamma} \) is estimated coefficient from (56).

Our baseline calibration implies that the treatment increases \( e \) from \( \epsilon_{IND} = 0.205 \) by 23% to \( \epsilon_{IND}^T = 0.25 \). Our calibration also implies that \( \epsilon_{US} = 0.282 \). Hence, Indian firms use 73% the amount of managerial services as firms in the U.S. and the treatment increases managerial services to 89% of the U.S. level. Hence, the treatment reduces the "management gap" by \( \frac{0.282 - 0.25}{0.282 - 0.205} \approx 60\% \). We can compare this number to the level of BVR scores in India and the U.S. and the predicted change in the BVR score due to the treatment stemming from (56). The average BVR score among U.S. firms is equal to 3.28. The average BVR score among Indian firms before the treatment is 2.6.

Using the estimated coefficient \( \hat{\gamma} \) and the change in managerial practices due to the treatment \( E[MP_f|Treatment] - E[MP_f] \), we find that the treatment increases the BVR score among treatment firms, \( E[BVR_f|Treatment] \), depending on how we treat outliers in the regression, to 2.84 on the low end and 3.12 on the high end. Hence, this exercise suggests that the treatment closes the "management gap" as measured by BVR scores by \( \frac{2.84 - 2.6}{2.84 - 2.6} = 35\% \) on the low end and \( \frac{3.12 - 2.6}{3.12 - 2.6} = 76\% \) on the high end. This is broadly consistent with the 60% number stemming from our analysis based on the model-implied differences in managerial services \( e \) reported above.

**B.4 Identifying Managerial Skill Supplies \( \mu_M \)**

To decompose differences in the managerial environment in India and the U.S. into supply and demand factors, we start out with 4 parameters: \((\mu_{M,US}, \alpha_{US}, \mu_{M,IND}, \alpha_{IND})\). Without loss of generality we can normalize \( \mu_{M,US} = 1 \). Since \( \mu_{M,c} \times \alpha_c \) is identified from the equilibrium managerial employment shares [see (48)], we require one additional equation to determine the relative managerial human capital in India, \( \mu_{M,IND} \). To do so, we use data on employment patterns of immigrants from India to the U.S.

Let \( \chi_c \) be the managerial share of the native population in country \( c \). Let \( \chi_{IND}^M \) be the managerial employment share in the population of Indian migrants in India (i.e., pre-migration). Let \( \chi_{US}^M \) be the managerial employment share in the population of Indian migrants in the U.S. (i.e., post-migration). Suppose that the distribution of managerial ability of Indians who migrate to the U.S. is distributed Pareto with shape \( \theta \) and mean \( \mu_{M,IND} \). If \( \mu_{M,IND} = \mu_{M,IND} \), migration is orthogonal to managerial skills. If \( \hat{\mu}_{M,IND} > \mu_{M,IND} \), migrants have, on average, a comparative advantage in managerial work. Given these assumptions it follows that
\[ \chi_c = \theta (\omega_M^c)^\theta (\mu_{M,c})^\theta \quad \text{and} \quad \chi_{IND}^M = \theta (\omega_M^c)^\theta (\hat{\mu}_{M,c})^\theta \]
where \( \hat{\theta} = (\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta})^\theta \) and \( \omega^c_M \) is the relative managerial wage \( \frac{w^M}{w^p} \) in country \( c \). Hence,

\[
\frac{\mu_{M,IND}}{\mu_{M,US}} = \left( \frac{\chi^M_{US}}{\chi^M_{IND}} \right)^{1/\theta} \times \left( \frac{\chi_{IND}}{\chi_{M,IND}} \right)^{1/\theta}.
\]

(57)

The first term in (57) compares migrants and U.S. natives in the U.S. economy, i.e., holding \( \alpha \) constant. Differences in managerial employment are therefore interpreted as differences in human capital. The second term accounts for selection into migration: if immigrants are positively selected on their managerial skills, i.e., \( \chi^M_{IND} > \chi_{IND} \), the observed differences in outcomes in the U.S. underestimate the differences in skills in the population. The last term in equation (57) corrects for that potential selection.

We want to note that this identification strategy relies on occupational sorting being based on skills - both before and after migrating. If for example Indian migrants face excessive frictions to enter managerial positions (relative to other jobs), their observed managerial employment share is lower than their skills warrant. In that case we would conclude that they have relatively little human capital. See for example Hsieh et al. (2019) for an elaboration of this point. Alternatively, migrants could have been more likely to work as managers prior to migrating relative to their innate skills.\(^{34} \)

If, for example, migrants stem from families, which are richer and more likely to own a business, migrants might have worked as managers before simply because of their family connection. In that case migrants might not be selected on their managerial skill but rather representative of the population at large. If that was the case, we would erroneously conclude that the U.S. population had a comparative advantage in managerial occupations. Again we want to stress that our identification strategy will correctly recover \( \alpha \times \mu \). The information in (57) is only used to separately identify \( \alpha \) and \( \mu \).

Given that we already calibrated \( \theta \) and we already used \( \chi_{IND} \) and \( \chi_{US} \) in our calibration. \( \chi^M_{US} \) is directly observable in the U.S. Census, because we see the employment structure among recent Indian immigrants. Finally, \( \chi^M_{IND} \) can be estimated from the New Immigration Study, which explicitly asks immigrants about the occupations prior to migration [see Hendricks and Schoellman (2017)].

The data to quantify (57) is contained in Table 11. Column 1 and 3 report the managerial share in the U.S. and India, respectively. In column 2 we report the managerial share among Indian immigrants in the U.S. To ensure that this population is informative about the human capital of recent Indian migrants, we restrict the sample to migrants that arrived in the U.S. within the last 5 years. The managerial share in this population is given by 12.9%. In the last column we exploit information from the New Immigration Study to measure the share of migrants that used to work as managers in India. We find that roughly 6% of them worked as outside manager.

The sample size for estimating the managerial share of migrants in India, \( \chi^M_{IND} \), is only 403, i.e., quite small. To judge the robustness of our results, we report the implied differences in delegation quality \( \frac{\alpha_{US}}{\alpha_{IND}} \) as a function of the point estimate of \( \chi^M_{IND} \). We treat the other empirical objects in (57), as fixed as these are precisely estimated. We construct the confidence intervals for \( \frac{\alpha_{US}}{\alpha_{IND}} \) using a Bootstrap procedure, where we repeatedly draw samples with replacement from the New Immigration Study data and calculate \( \chi^M_{IND} \). The results of this exercise are contained in Figure 10. We find that the relative delegation efficiency of the U.S. is between 1.7 and 3.1 of the one in India with 90% probability. We also want to stress that this uncertainty only affects the decomposition of the implied counterfactual into the human capital and the delegation efficiency component, as all allocation only depend on \( \mu_{M,c,\alpha,c} \).

\(^{34}\)We are grateful to one of our referees to suggest this possibility.
Table 11: Identification of Managerial Skills: Managerial Employment Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Population</th>
<th>Male, 20-60 years, employed</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. population</td>
<td>Indian migrants</td>
<td>Indian population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial share</td>
<td>$\chi_{US}$</td>
<td>$\chi_{US}^M$</td>
<td>$\chi_{IND}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data source</td>
<td>U.S. Census</td>
<td>U.S. Census</td>
<td>Indian Census</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table contains estimates for the managerial employment share in the native population of the U.S. (column 1), the population Indian immigrants in the U.S. (column 2), the native population in India (column 3), and the sample of Indian migrants to the U.S. in India (column 4). For the definition of outsider managers, see Table 1 and the discussion there. $\chi_{US}$ and $\chi_{US}^M$ are calculated from the U.S. census and $\chi_{IND}$ from the Indian census. $\chi_{IND}^M$ is calculated from the data of the New Immigration Study. We refer to Hendricks and Schoellman (2017) for a detailed description of the data. For the New Immigration Study we use the occupational codes “10 to 430: executive, administrative and managerial” and “500 to 950: management related” as referring to managers. We also insist on the individual having received a salary (instead of, for example, being self-employed).

Figure 10: Calibrating $\frac{\chi_{US}}{\chi_{IND}}$

Notes: The figure depicts the resulting $\frac{\chi_{US}}{\chi_{IND}}$ as a function of $\chi_{IND}^M$. Our point estimate for the immigrants’ managerial share in India (6.1%) yields a relative delegation quality of 2.05. The 5-to-95 confidence interval around that value ranges from about 1.7 to 3.1.

B.5 Moment Sensitivity

In Table 12 we report a sensitivity matrix, which contains the elasticity of each moment used in the internal calibration (rows) with respect to the parameters of the model (columns). Specifically, we report percentage change in the moment for a 1% change in the parameter from its benchmark calibrated value, while keeping the rest of the parameters at their benchmark values. We report the average elasticities based on +1% and -1% changes. This provides useful information about how the parameters influence the model counterpart of targeted moments. For brevity, we report the matrix for our India calibration. The sensitivity matrix for the U.S. calibration is available upon request.

B.6 Reduced-Form Evidence based on Variation across Indian Establishments

In Section 4.2, we reported some basic patterns on managerial hiring and firm size from the Indian micro data and discussed how they relate to our theory. This section describes this analysis in more


### Table 12: Moment Sensitivity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M1. Entryrate</th>
<th>δ</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>α × μ</th>
<th>θ</th>
<th>θ_θ</th>
<th>θ_σ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2. Mean empl. of 21-25-year-old firms</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M3. Empl. share of 21-25-year-old firms</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M4. Rel. exit rate of small 21-25-year-old firms</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5. Employment share of no-manager firms</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M6. Share of managers</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M7. Share of entrepreneurial profit</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M8. Treatment effect of Bloom et al. (2013)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>-1.69</td>
<td>-1.66</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>-2.77</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** The table presents the elasticity for each moment used the internal calibration for India with respect to the parameters of the model. In particular, we report percentage change in the moment for a 1% change in the parameter from its benchmark value in the Indian calibration, while keeping the rest of the parameters at their benchmark values. We report the average elasticities based on +1% and -1% changes. To identify α and μ separately, we use the manager share among Indian migrants before and after emigrating to the U.S. See Section B.4 for more information.

detail.

Our empirical investigation mainly focuses on the implications of the two parameters of our model: (i) entrepreneur’s time endowment $T$ and (ii) delegation efficiency $\alpha$. In the theory, time endowment of entrepreneurs $T$ has the interpretation that it can neither be sold on the market, nor is there any need to monitor. The NSS data for 1995 contain information on the size of the family of the establishment’s owner. As long as family members require less monitoring time than outside managers, we can think of family size as inducing variation in the time endowment $T$. As for the delegation efficiency $\alpha$, we will rely on the variation in trust across 22 Indian states. The Indian micro data contain information about the state in which the respective establishment is located. Additionally, we extract information on the general level of trust between people at the state level from the World Value Surveys. The World Values Survey is a collection of surveys based on representative samples of individuals and provides an index of trust in different regions of India. The primary index we use is derived from the answers to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can not be too careful in dealing with people?”. Following Bloom et al. (2012) and La Porta et al. (1997), the regional trust index is constructed as the percentage of people providing the answer “Most people can be trusted” within the state where the firm is located. This is the most common measure of trust used in the literature. While this variable is not directly aimed at eliciting the (perceived) quality of the prevailing legal environment, it fits well into our theoretical framework as long as trust reduces the required time the owner needs to spend to incentivize outside managers. See also Bloom et al. (2012), who also use this variable to proxy the efficiency with which decisions can be delegated.

In Table 13, we look at some of the implications of our theory based on the above-mentioned proxies. We first focus on the extensive margin of managerial hiring. In the model, a firm hires an outside manager only when its size $n$ is above a certain (endogenous) threshold which we denote as $n^*$

$$n^* \equiv T \times \left( \frac{\omega_M}{\alpha \theta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}.$$  

For the purpose of the empirical analysis, in addition to firm size $n$, suppose that firms also differ in (i) owner’s time endowment $T$ and (ii) delegation efficiency $\alpha$. Then, the extensive margin of
managerial hiring decision for firm $f$ can be summarized as

$$1 \left[ \text{Manager}_f > 0 \right] = 1 \left[ n_f \geq n_f^* \right]$$

$$= 1 \left[ n_f \geq T_f \times \left( \frac{\omega_M}{\sigma \alpha_f} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} \right]$$

$$= 1 \left[ \log n_f - \log T_f + \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \times \log \alpha_f + \text{const.} \geq 0 \right] ,$$

where subscript $f$ indicates firm specific values and const. includes all terms that are not firm specific. This relation can be converted to an estimable one by introducing some stochasticity. In particular, by introducing a uniformly distributed random variable, which can be considered as measurement error, to the RHS of the above equation and taking the expectation of both sides, we get

$$\mathbb{P} \left( \text{Manager}_f > 0 \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log n_f - \beta_2 \log T_f + \beta_3 \log \alpha_f .$$ (58)

This equation implies that the likelihood of hiring a manager should be increasing in firm size and delegation efficiency and declining in the owner’s time endowment. To test these predictions empirically, we estimate the coefficients of (58) by using the proxy variables mentioned above.$^{35}$ Column 1 of Table 13 summarizes the results. It suggests that the predictions of the model regarding extensive margin of managerial hiring are in line with the data: empirically large firms and firms in states with favorable trust measures are more likely to hire outside managers, while firms with larger families abstain from hiring outside managerial personnel holding firm size constant.

**Table 13: Managerial Hiring, Firms Size and Growth in India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Manager &gt; 0</th>
<th>Log empl (Manager &gt; 0)</th>
<th>Log empl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Log Empl</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
<td>0.224***</td>
<td>0.235***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log HH Size</td>
<td>-0.003**</td>
<td>0.927***</td>
<td>0.812***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.013**</td>
<td>3.264**</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(1.628)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log HH Size*Trust</td>
<td>-1.694**</td>
<td>-1.329*</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.694)</td>
<td>(0.818)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>(0.758)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State FE</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>178,999</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>178,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.10$. All regressions include 2-digit fixed effects, the age of the establishment, year dummies, and a dummy variable for the establishment to be in a rural area as control variables. For the regressions that do not include state-level fixed effects, log GDP per capita at the state level is included as a control variable. “Log Empl” denotes the (log of) total employment at the establishment. “Log HH size” denotes the (log of) the size of the household of the establishment’s owner. This variable is only available for the NSS data. “Trust” is the measure of trust at the state level, which we calculate from the World Value Surveys. The dependent variables are: an indicator of managerial hiring (column 1), log employment conditional on managerial hiring (columns 2 - 3), log employment (columns 4-5).

These static determinants of managerial hiring have dynamic implications relating to firms’ expansion incentives and hence firm size. In particular, conditional on hiring managers, growth

$^{35}$Note that (58) implies a linear probability model and its parameters can be estimated using OLS. We also include additional control variables in the regression. Details are given in the notes under Table 13.
incentives and hence firm size are increasing in delegation efficiency. Our theory implies that delegation efficiency \( \alpha \) and the owner’s time endowment \( T \) are substitutes, i.e., we should expect a tighter link between family size and firm size in low-trust regions. Columns 2 and 3 show that this is the case. First, similar to Bloom et al. (2013), we also find a tight relationship between firm size and family size. We interpret this correlation as family members substituting for the scarcity of available outside managers. Furthermore, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative, which means that the positive relationship between firm size and family size is weaker in regions where trust is higher and hence delegation is more efficient.\(^{36}\) In column 3, we replicate these results with state fixed effects to control for all time-invariant regional characteristics.

In columns 4 and 5, we redo the analysis of columns 2 and 3 for the whole sample of firms, i.e., we do not condition on delegation. Again we find a positive correlation between the size of the family and firm size. Note that the effect of trust for the entire sample of firms is much weaker. This is consistent with our theory, which implies that delegation efficiency only matters for the firms that actually delegate. For firms without outside managers (i.e., firms with \( n < n^* \)), growth incentives are only determined by the owner’s time endowment \( T \).

Finally, we replicated the entire analysis of Table 13, which controlled for 2-digit sector fixed effects, with 3-sector fixed effects. The results are contained in Table 14. It is seen that results are similar. The only exception are the results in columns 2 and 3, which are conditioned on managerial hiring and hence have a small sample size\(^ {37}\). While all point estimates are of the same sign, they are not significantly different from zero.

---

**Table 14: Managerial Hiring, Firms Size and Growth in India: Robustness**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Manager &gt; 0</th>
<th>Log empl (Manager &gt; 0)</th>
<th>Log empl</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Log Empl</td>
<td>0.040***</td>
<td>0.389</td>
<td>0.207***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log HH Size</td>
<td>-0.004***</td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(1.300)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.012*</td>
<td>-0.443</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.658)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log HH Size* Trust</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State FE</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>178,999</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>2,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** \( p<0.01 \), ** \( p<0.05 \), * \( p<0.10 \). All regressions include 3-digit fixed effects, the age of the establishment, and a dummy variable for the establishment to be in a rural area as control variables. For the regressions that do not include state level fixed effects, log GDP per capita at the state-level is included as a control variable. “Log Empl” denotes the (log of) total employment at the establishment. “Log HH size” denotes the (log of) the size of the household of the establishment’s owner. This variable is only available for the NSS data. “Trust” is the measure of trust at the state level, which we calculate from the World Value Surveys. The dependent variables are: an indicator of managerial hiring (column 1), log employment conditional on managerial hiring (columns 2 - 3), log employment (columns 4-5).

---

\(^{36}\)In a separate regression, not shown here, we also control for the assets of the firm as both family size and the level of regional trust could be correlated with the supply of capital to the firm. The results are very similar.

\(^{37}\)Given the small sample size, finer controls for sector fixed effect leave less variation in the data for the relations we are interested in.
Online Appendix for
“Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries”
by Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, Michael Peters
July 9, 2019
- Not for Publication Unless Requested -

OA-1 Online Appendix - Theory

OA-1.1 Static Equilibrium
Consider the equilibrium in the product market. At each point in time, each product line $j$ is produced by a single firm with productivity $q_{jt}$. We normalize the price of aggregate output $Y$ to one. As firms set a price equal to $p_{jf} = q_{jf}^{-1} w_t$ we get that
\[
\ln(Y) = \int_0^1 \ln(y_j) d\mu_j = \int_0^1 \ln(p_j y_j) d\mu_j = \ln(Y) - \ln(w_P) + \int_0^1 \ln(q_j) d\mu_j
\]
which implies $w_P = Q \equiv \exp \left[ \int_0^1 \ln(q_j) d\mu_j \right]$. The production function [see equation (3)] also implies that
\[
L_P = \int_0^1 l_j d\mu_j = \int_0^1 \frac{y_j p_j}{q_j} d\mu_j = \frac{Y}{w} \int_0^1 \mu_j^{-1} d\mu_j, \tag{OA-1}
\]
where $L_P$ is the aggregate demand for production labor. Using that $\mu_j = \frac{1}{1-e(n_j)^{\sigma}}$, where $n_j$ is the number of products the producer of product $j$ has in its portfolio, (OA-1) implies that $L_P = \frac{1}{\lambda \omega_P}$, where $\omega_P = \frac{w_P}{Y}$ and $\lambda$ is given by
\[
\lambda = \left[ 1 - \sum_{n=1}^\infty (e(n))^{\sigma} \times n \times \left( v_n^H F^H + v_n^L F^L \right) \right]^{-1},
\]
where function $e(.)$ is defined in (7), $v_n^i$ and $F^i$ are the size distribution and the measure of $i$-type firms, $i \in \{H, L\}$, respectively (see Proposition 1).

OA-1.2 A Simple Microfoundation for $\alpha$
In this section, we provide a simple example of how $\alpha$ could depend on various institutional parameters in an economy. Please note that none of the analysis in the main text depends on this particular example. This example is provided to fix ideas.

Suppose that both managers and entrepreneurs each have one unit of time at their disposal. While the latter can provide $T$ units of effort during that time interval, managers can provide 1 unit of effort. Suppose that the provision of managerial effort is subject to contractual frictions. For simplicity, assume that the manager can decide to either provide effort or shirk, in which case he adds no usable services to the firm. The firms can translate each unit of managerial effort into $\eta$ units of managerial services.

While the manager’s effort choice is not contractible, the entrepreneur can monitor the manager to prevent him from shirking. If the entrepreneur spends $s$ units of her time monitoring the manager,
she will catch a shirking manager with probability $s$. Whenever the manager shirks and gets caught, the entrepreneur can go to court and sue the manager for the managerial wage $w$. In particular, the court (rightly) decides in the entrepreneur’s favor with probability $\kappa$. Hence one can think of $\kappa$ as parameterizing the efficiency of the legal system. Finally, the demand for shirking arises because shirking carries a private benefit $bw$, where $b < 1$.

It is straightforward to characterize the equilibrium of this simple game. If the entrepreneur spends $s$ units of her time monitoring the manager, the manager does not shirk if and only if

$$ w \geq bw + w (1 - \kappa s), $$

where $(1 - \kappa s)$ is the probability that the manager gets paid despite having shirked. Clearly the owner will never employ a manager without inducing effort. Hence, the owner will spend $s = b / \kappa$ units of time monitoring the manager. The overall amount of managerial services in product line $j$ is therefore given by

$$ e_j = \frac{T}{n} - m_j s + \eta m_j = \frac{T}{n} + \left( \eta - \frac{b}{\kappa} \right) \times m_j = \frac{T}{n} + \alpha (\kappa, \eta, b) \times m_j. $$

(OA-2)

Hence, $\alpha$ measures precisely the net increase in managerial services through delegation. In particular, the delegation efficiency is increasing in the firm’s efficiency to employ managers ($\eta$) and in the state of the contractual environment ($\kappa$), because monitoring and the strength of the legal system are substitutes. Note also that the whole purpose of delegation is to increase a firm’s managerial resources, so that firms will never hire a manager if $\alpha (\kappa, \eta) \leq 0$. Hence, whenever managers are sufficiently unproductive or the quality of legal systems is sufficiently low, firms will never want to hire outside managers because owners need to spend more of their own time to prevent the opportunistic behavior of managers than they gain in return.

OA-1.3 Stationary Equilibrium of the Model

In this section, we describe the stationary equilibrium of the model in detail. To do so, we proceed in two steps.

**Step 1** Fix $s \equiv (n^*, \omega_P)$ where $n^*$ and $\omega_P$ are delegation cut-off and normalized wage rate for production workers, respectively. By using (37) and (38), we can write the rate of destruction for high types $\tau_H(s)$ as

$$ \tau_H(s) = z(s) \times \left\{ \delta \sum_{h=1}^{\infty} \prod_{j=1}^{h} \left( \frac{x_j(s)}{\tau_H(s)} \right) \right\} + 1 - (1 - \delta) \left( \frac{\beta - 1}{\beta} \right), $$

(OA-3)

where $[x_j(s)]_{j=1}^{\infty}$ is the optimal innovation policy by high types implicitly defined in (13) and $z(s)$ is the optimal entry rate. We focus on a solution where $x_j < \tau_H$ for all $\tau_H$. This is a sufficient condition for a stationary solution. We will show below that such a solution exists for all $s$ provided that $\theta_E$ is large enough.

Let $v_H(n)$ be normalized value function (normalized with $Y_i$) of a high-type firm depicted in

---

38 The necessity for the private benefit being proportional to the wage arises in order to make the contract stationary.

39 Note that we do not require that $s < T$, i.e., we do not require the owner to perform the monitoring himself. We rather think of managerial efficiency units to be perfect substitutes within the firm, i.e., an owner can hire a manager to monitor other managers.

40 A necessary condition is that there exists $\hat{n}$ with $x_j < \tau_H$ for all $j > \hat{n}$.
so that the monotonicity condition is satisfied. Lastly, for any continuous bounded function \( f \) where \( \omega = Q \) to substitute \( \hat{\varphi} \) with \( \omega \) and \( r = \rho + g \) from household problem. By rearranging terms and explicitly imposing the restriction \( x_j < \tau_H \), we can write \( v_H \) as

\[
v_H(n) = n \times \max_{x_n < \tau_H} \left\{ \frac{\pi(n,n^*) - \omega \theta^{-\frac{1}{2}} n x_n^\frac{1}{2} + x_n n [v_H(n+1) - v_H(n)] + \tau_H n [v_H(n-1) - v_H(n)]}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} \right\}.
\]

Now consider the function \( b(n) \equiv \frac{v_H(n)}{n} \), which - by using the above equation - can be written as

\[
b(n) = \max_{x_n < \tau_H} \left\{ h(n,x_n) + \frac{x_n(n+1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} b(n+1) + \frac{\tau_H(n-1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} b(n-1) \right\},
\]

where \( h(n,x_n) \equiv \frac{\pi(n,n^*) - \omega \theta^{-\frac{1}{2}} n x_n^\frac{1}{2}}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} \).

We will show that the right-hand side of (OA-4) satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a contraction. To see this, define the operator \( T \) by

\[
(Tf)(n) \equiv \max_{x_n < \tau_H} \left\{ h(n,x_n) + \frac{x_n(n+1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} f(n+1) + \frac{\tau_H(n-1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} f(n-1) \right\}.
\]

Hence, \( b \) can be defined as a fixed point of \( T \), i.e., a function such that \( (Tb)(n) = b(n) \). First, note that \( h(n,x_n) \) is bounded [see (11)] so that \( T \) maps the space of continuous bounded functions into itself (Berge’s Maximum Theorem). Moreover, for any continuous bounded functions \( f, g \) with \( f(n) \leq g(n) \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \), we have

\[
(Tf)(n) = \max_{x_n < \tau_H} \left\{ h(n,x_n) + \frac{x_n(n+1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} f(n+1) + \frac{\tau_H(n-1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} f(n-1) \right\} \\
\leq \max_{x_n < \tau_H} \left\{ h(n,x_n) + \frac{x_n(n+1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} g(n+1) + \frac{\tau_H(n-1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} g(n-1) \right\} = (Tg)(n),
\]

so that the monotonicity condition is satisfied. Lastly, for any continuous bounded function \( f \) and \( a \geq 0 \),

\[
(T[f + a])(n) = \max_{x_n < \tau_H} \left\{ h(n,x_n) + \frac{x_n(n+1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} [f(n+1) + a] + \frac{\tau_H(n-1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} [f(n-1) + a] \right\} \\
\leq \max_{x_n < \tau_H} \left\{ h(n,x_n) + \frac{x_n(n+1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} f(n+1) + \frac{\tau_H(n-1)}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} f(n-1) \right\} + \Omega a \\
= (TF)(n) + \Omega a
\]

where

\[
\Omega \equiv \max_{x_n < \tau_H} \left\{ \frac{(x_n + \tau_H)n}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} + \frac{x_n - \tau_H}{\rho + (x_n + \tau_H)n} \right\} < 1.
\]

\(^{41}\)We drop the dependence of the value function on \( s \) for notational clarity. 
\(^{42}\)See Section OA-1.1 for details.
Hence, the operator $T$ satisfies the discounting condition, so that $T$ is a contraction mapping and therefore possesses a unique fixed point [Stokey et al. (1989)], which is continuous in $s$ and $\tau_H$. Moreover, the expression inside the max operator in (OA-5) is continuous in $x_n$ and strictly concave so that Berge’s Maximum Theorem implies that the set of maximizers $x_n^*$ is a continuous function of $s$ and $\tau_H$. The equilibrium entry rate $z$ is fully determined from $v_H$ and $v_L$ [see (17)] and hence also a continuous function of $s$ and $\tau_H$.\footnote{Recall that $v_L(1) = \frac{\pi(1)}{\rho + \tau_H}$, where $\tau_L = \beta \times \tau_H$.}

Hence, equation (OA-3) is continuous in $\tau_H$. To see that there exists a fixed point for $\tau_H$, note that the RHS is bounded away from zero because $z(s) > 0$ and that it is bounded from above. To see that, note that $\sum_{h=1}^{\infty} \prod_{j=1}^{n} \left( \frac{x_j(s)}{v_H(s)} \right)$ is bounded in a stationary equilibrium and that $z$ is bounded [see (17)]. Hence, there exists a fixed point for $\tau_H$. Moreover, because $z$ is increasing in $\theta_E$ for a given $s$ and $\tau_H$, (OA-3) implies that for each $s$ there is $\theta_E$ large enough such that this fixed point satisfies $\tau_H > x_n$.

**Step 2** We can now represent the whole model in terms of labor market clearing conditions. The Cobb-Douglas final good production function together with the market structure described in Section 2.1 implies that the total number of production workers hired for variety $j$ by a producer, who is active in $n$ markets, is given by\footnote{To see this, note that $Y = p_j y_j = \frac{\pi \mu}{\eta} q_j \mu(e) l_j$ and $\omega_p = \omega_p / Y$.}

$$l_j = [\omega_p \mu(e)]^{-1} = \omega_p^{-1} \times (1 - e(n)^\sigma).$$

Using firms’ optimal delegation policy and aggregating over the firm size distribution yields the aggregate demand for production workers is given by

$$H^p = \left[ 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \left( \max \left\{ \frac{T}{n'}, \frac{T}{n^*} \right\} \right)^\sigma \times n \times \varphi_n \right] \times \omega_p^{-1} \quad \text{(OA-6)}$$

Similarly, firms’ managerial demand function implies that the aggregate demand for managers is given by

$$H^M = \sum_{n \geq n^*}^\infty n \times m(n) \times \varphi_n = \left( \frac{\sigma}{\omega_M} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \alpha^\sigma \sum_{n \geq n^*}^\infty n \varphi_n - \frac{\varphi}{\alpha} \sum_{n \geq n^*}^\infty \varphi_n. \quad \text{(OA-7)}$$

Given Step 1, we can calculate the firm size distribution $\varphi_n(s) = \nu_n^H(s) F^H(s) + \nu_n^L(s) F^L(s)$ from Proposition 1. From (24), (OA-6), and (OA-7), the labor market clearing conditions for managers and production workers can then be written by

$$0 = \left( \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta - 1} \mu_M \right)^\theta \left( \frac{(n^*)^{1-\sigma} \alpha}{T^{1-\sigma} \omega_p} \right)^{\theta - 1} \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} - \frac{T}{\alpha} \sum_{n \geq n^*}^\infty \left( \frac{1}{n^*} - \frac{1}{n} \right) n \varphi_n(s) \quad \text{(OA-8)}$$

$$0 = 1 - \left( \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta - 1} \mu_M \right)^\theta \left( \frac{(n^*)^{1-\sigma} \alpha}{T^{1-\sigma} \omega_p} \right)^{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{\omega_p} \left[ 1 - \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \left( \max \left\{ \frac{T}{n'}, \frac{T}{n^*} \right\} \right)^\sigma \varphi_n(s) \right] \quad \text{(OA-9)}$$

where two equations depend only on $s \equiv (n^*, \omega_p)$. Note that $\varphi_n(s)$ is continuous in $z$, $\tau_H$ and $x_n$. Therefore, from Step 1, left-hand-side of both equations are continuous in $(n^*, \omega_p)$. Solution to the system of equation given by (OA-8) and (OA-9) constitutes an equilibrium for our economy.
OA-2 Online Appendix - Empirical Analysis

OA-2.1 Firms vs. Establishments in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector

In this section we compare the process of firm-dynamics across U.S. manufacturing firms and establishments. Table OA-1 provides some summary statistics about the size-distribution of firms and establishments in the U.S. The average manufacturing firm in the U.S. has 51 employees, while the average establishment only 43. It is also the case that large firms have multiple establishments (firms with more than 1000 employees have on average 13) so that large firms account for half of total employment. There is a lower concentration at the establishment level in that establishments with more than 1000 employees account for less than one-fifth of aggregate employment in manufacturing in the U.S.

Table OA-1: Descriptive Statistics: U.S. Micro Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Firms</th>
<th>Establishments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1-4</td>
<td>86936</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>48178</td>
<td>6.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>37942</td>
<td>13.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49</td>
<td>32555</td>
<td>30.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>13516</td>
<td>67.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-249</td>
<td>8914</td>
<td>139.90</td>
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<td>3167</td>
<td>280.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-999</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>503.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000+</td>
<td>2423</td>
<td>2531.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td>235351</td>
<td>51.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table contains summary statistics for U.S. manufacturing firms and establishments in 2012. The data are taken from the BDS.

We now turn to the implied dynamics. Because we focus on cross-sectional data, the information on firm (establishment) age is crucial for us. For establishments, the definition of age is straightforward. Birth year is defined as the year a establishment first reports positive employment in the LBD. Establishment age is computed by taking the difference between the current year of operation and the birth year. Given that the LBD series starts in 1976, the observed age is by construction left censored at 1975. In contrast, firm age is computed from the age of the establishments belonging to that particular firm. A firm is assigned an initial age by determining the age of the oldest establishment that belongs to the firm at the time of birth. Firm age accumulates with every additional year after that. In Figure OA-1 we show the cross-sectional age-size relationship for establishments (left panel) and firms (right panel) in the U.S.

Not surprisingly, the life-cycle is much steeper for firms, especially for +26-year-old ones, as firms grow both on the intensive margin at the establishment level and the extensive margin of adding establishments to their operation.

In Figure OA-2 we show the aggregate employment share of establishments and firms of different ages. As suggested by the life-cycle patterns in Figure OA-1, old firms account for the bulk of employment in the U.S. However, the relative importance of old establishments/firms is somewhat less pronounced because of exit, i.e., while the average firm/establishment grows substantially by age conditional on survival, many firms/establishments have already exited by the time they would have been 20 years old. Nevertheless, firms (establishments) older than 25 years account for 76% (53%) of employment in the manufacturing sector.
Figure OA-1: Life Cycle of Establishments and firms in the U.S.

The Life Cycle in the US (Plants)

The Life Cycle in the US (Firms)

Notes: The figure contains the cross-sectional age-size relationship for establishments (left panel) and firms (right panel) in the U.S. The data are taken from the BDS and we focus on the data for 2012. We depict the results for both the manufacturing sector and the entire economy.

Figure OA-2: The employment share by age of establishments and firms in the U.S.

Aggregate Employment Share (Plants)

Aggregate Employment Share (Firms)

Notes: The figure contains the aggregate employment share of establishments (left panel) and firms (right panel) in the U.S. as a function of age. The data are taken from the BDS and we focus on the data for 2012. We depict the results for both the manufacturing sector and the entire economy.

This pattern of exit is depicted in Figure OA-3. There we show annual exit rates for firms and establishments as a function of age. The declining exit hazard is very much suggestive of a model of creative destruction, whereby firms and establishments grow as they age (conditional on survival) and exit rates are lower for bigger firms/establishments.

An important moment for us is the age-specific exit rate conditional on size. It is this moment that will identify the importance of selection. In a model without heterogeneity, size will be a sufficient statistic for future performance, so that age should not predict exit conditional on size. However, if the economy consists of high- and low-type entrepreneurs, old firms are more likely to be composed of high types conditional on size. Hence, the size-specific exit rate by age is monotone in the share of high types by age. In Figure OA-4 we report this schedule for both establishments.
**Figure OA-3: The Exit Rates of Establishments and Firms in the U.S. by Age**

![Graphs showing exit rates in the US for plants and firms](image)

*Notes:* The figure contains the exit rates of establishments (left panel) and firms (right panel) in the U.S. as a function of age. The data are taken from the BDS and we focus on the data for 2012. We depict the results for both the manufacturing sector and the entire economy.

and firms. The data show a large degree of age-dependence (conditional on size). The schedules for small firms and establishments look almost identical. This is reassuring because small firms are almost surely single-establishment firms, so that a firm-exit will also be a establishment-exit and vice versa.

**Figure OA-4: Size-dependent exit rates of establishments and firms in the U.S. by age**

![Graphs showing exit rates by size and age](image)

*Notes:* The figure contains the conditional exit rates by size of establishments (left panel) and firms (right panel) in the U.S. as a function of age. The data are taken from the BDS and we focus on the data for 2012. We depict the results for the manufacturing sector.

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**OA-2.2 Establishments in the Indian Manufacturing Sector**

In this section we provide more descriptive evidence about the underlying process of firm dynamics in the manufacturing sector in India. Table OA-2 contains descriptive statistics for our sample of Indian manufacturing establishments. For comparison, we organize the data in the same way as in the left panel of Table OA-1, which contains the results for manufacturing establishments in the
U.S. It is clearly seen that the establishment-size distribution in India is concentrated on very small firms. The average establishment has fewer than 3 employees and more than 50% of aggregate employment is concentrated in establishments with at least 4 employees. Such establishments account for 93% of all establishments in the Indian manufacturing sector. A comparison of establishment size distribution for the years 1995 and 2010 in Table OA-3 suggests that these patterns are stable over time.

**Table OA-2: Descriptive Statistics: Indian Micro Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Avg. Employment</th>
<th>Aggregate Employment Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>15957296</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>54.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>843091</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>11.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>243868</td>
<td>12.98</td>
<td>6.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49</td>
<td>70834</td>
<td>29.22</td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99</td>
<td>23242</td>
<td>69.89</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100-249</td>
<td>14898</td>
<td>149.31</td>
<td>4.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250-499</td>
<td>4701</td>
<td>346.69</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-999</td>
<td>2283</td>
<td>683.86</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000+</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>2452.65</td>
<td>6.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td>17161445</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table contains summary statistics for establishments in the Indian manufacturing sector in 2010. The data are taken from the ASI and the NSS. To calculate the number of firms, we use the sampling weights provided in the data.

**Table OA-3: Establishment Size Distribution in India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm Size</th>
<th>1-4</th>
<th>5-9</th>
<th>10-19</th>
<th>20-49</th>
<th>50+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.9171</td>
<td>0.0631</td>
<td>0.0143</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>0.0020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.9297</td>
<td>0.0491</td>
<td>0.0143</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents the share of establishments for different size bins in India, for the years 1995 and 2010. Size bins are constructed based on number of employees.

Figure OA-5 reports the aggregate employment share by age for Indian manufacturing establishments and is hence comparable to Figure OA-2 for the U.S.

It is clearly seen that the aggregate importance of old firms is very small in India. While firms, that are older than 25 years account for 55% of employment in the U.S., the corresponding number is less than 20% in India. This is a reflection of the shallow life-cycle in India and not of there being fewer old firms in the Indian economy.
Figure OA-5: The employment share by age of establishments in India

Notes: The figure contains the aggregate employment share of manufacturing establishments in India as a function of age. The data are taken from the ASI and the NSS and we focus on the data for 2010. We combine the two data sets using the sampling weights provided in the micro data.